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ATTORNEY DISQUALIFICATION FOR A CONFLICT OF
INTEREST IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION: A
CONFUSING BODY OF LAW IN NEED OF
ORGANIZATION*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past ten years it has become increasingly popular for liti-
gants to move' for the disqualification of opposing counsel for a conflict
* The subject of attorney disqualification for a conflict of interest arises in
many contexts. Federal and state courts deal with the issue in both civil and
criminal actions. Any attempt to deal with all of the possible situations in which
the issue arises is beyond the scope of this note. This note deals only with the
issue of conflict of interests arising in civil litigation in federal courts.
The subject of this note has been discussed in numerous law reviews over
the past thirty years. The authors of practically every article written on the
subject have concentrated upon the relationship between the courts' treatment
of motions to disqualify counsel for a conflict of interest and the standards
suggested by the American Bar Association. See generally Kaufman, The Former
Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657
(1957); Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and
Policy, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 996 (1979); Comment, Subsequent Representation and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: An Evaluation of Rules 1.9 and 1.10, 1984 ARiz.
ST. L.J. 161; Note, Ethical Considerations When an Attorney Opposes a Former Client.
The Needfor a Realistic Application of Canon Nine, 52 Cm.[-]KErr L. REV. 525 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Ethical Considerations]; Note, Ethical Problems for the Law
Firm of a Former Government Attorney: Firm or Individual Disqualification?, 1977 DUKE
L.J. 512 [hereinafter cited as Note, Ethical Problems]; Note, The Second Circuit and
Attorney Disqualification-Silver Chrysler Steers in a New Direction, 44 FORDHAM L.
REV. 130 (1975-76) [hereinafter cited as Note, New Direction]; Unchanging Rules in
Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J.
1058 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Unchanging Rules]. See also Sutton, How
Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C.L. REV. 497 (1979)
(reporter for the ABA committee which wrote the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility criticizes courts as having misapplied various provisions of the
Code). Because so many previous authors have concentrated upon the
significance of the ABA standards, another such endeavor would be redundant.
This note attempts only to sort out the various court decisions on attorney
disqualification for a conflict of interest, and to present a means of determining
in advance of litigation whether the courts will permit a given representation.
While any attempt to discuss the issues involved in such cases necessarily
involves some discussion of the ABA standards, this note will confine such
discussions to the footnotes for the most part.
1. "A motion to disqualify counsel is the proper method for a party-litigant
to bring the issues of a conflict of interest or breaches of ethical duties to the
attention of the court." Musicus v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 621 F.2d 742,
744 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 376
(S.D. Tex. 1969)). See also Peterson, Rebuttable Presumptions and Intra-Firm Screen-
ing: The New Seventh Circuit Approach to Vicarious Disqualification of Litigation Counsel,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 399, 401 (1984) (issue may be raised when opposing
attorney who is suspected of a conflict of interest files a motion to declare quali-
(463)
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of interest.2 Such motions give rise to a multiplicity of issues. 3 While
fication and the opposing party follows with a cross motion to disqualify the
attorney).
Standing is not generally an issue when the courts are faced with motions to
disqualify counsel for a conflict of interest. Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844,
847-48 (1st Cir. 1984) (adopting standard that any attorney has standing to raise
a potential violation of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility) (citing
United States v. Clarkson, 567 F.2d 270, 271 n.1 (4th Cir. 1977); Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp. V. Daniel Int'l Corp., 563 F.2d 673 (5th Cir.)); cf Wilson
P. Abraham Const. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir.
1977) (movant need not be ex-client, but if movant is not ex-client, presumption
of disclosed confidences will not apply to adverse subsequent representation in
substantially related matter); Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., No. 73 C 107
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1977), reprinted as appendix to Whiting Corp. v. Whiting Mach.
Corp., 567 F.2d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 1977) (without regard to whether movant is
ex-client, "once appraised of an alleged breach of professional responsibility
[the court] has a duty to determine whether there is any substance to the accusa-
tions"), affd, 567 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). But see Murchison v.
Kirby, 201 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (only a former or present client has
standing to raise a conflict of interest). In Murchison, the court stated:
While . . . any member of the public may present an accusation of
breach of professional conduct against an attorney to the appropriate
bar association . . . this does not mean that he may come into court in
an action in which he is an interested party and seek to disqualify the
opposing attorney, solely on the ground of violation of the Canons of
Ethnics.
Id. at 123. Cf Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 294 (6th
Cir. 1979) (while any party to litigation has "a right . . . to call the attention of
the District Judge to the possible conflict of interest . . . this fact should not be
construed as automatically granting a right to an appeal of a denial of disqualifi-
cation where . . . the would-be appellant cannot show a possibility of injury").
See also 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 47 (1980).
As standing generally is not an issue, the motion to disqualify counsel can
be raised by any party to the litigation, or the judge can raise the issue on his
own accord. See W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821, 823 (D.
Conn. 1961) (hearing held sua sponte to determine whether plaintiff's attorney
should be disqualified), af'd, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962). The procedure for
the motion is governed by rules seven through sixteen of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The partial text of such a motion is set down in Cord v. Smith,
338 F.2d 516, 519 n.l (9th Cir. 1964).
If an action is brought in federal court on the basis of either federal ques-
tion or diversity jurisdiction, federal common law governs the court's decision to
disqualify counsel. IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 279 n.2 (3d Cir. 1978)
(conduct of practitioners before the federal courts must be governed by the
rules of those courts rather than the state courts); Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516,
524 (9th Cir. 1964) (The Erie doctrine is not controlling upon questions of at-
torney conduct before federal courts).
2. The policies underlying disqualification for a conflict of interest are two-
fold. First, the policies are substantially similar to the policies for making attor-
ney-client communications privileged, i.e., "to encourage free discussion by the
client . . . and . . . to deter the advertent or inadvertent use of privileged com-
munications to the advantage or disadvantage of a new client." Kevlik v. Gold-
stein, 724 F.2d 844, 849-50 (1st Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). Second, such
disqualifications are intended to promote faith in the profession by the general
public. Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 565 (2d Cir. 1973). In Emle,
the court wrote: "The dynamics of litigation are far too subtle, the attorney's
role in that process is far too critical, and the public's interest in the outcome is
2
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the various district courts and courts of appeals that have considered
such motions (and appeals therefrom) have generated consistent resolu-
tions of many of the issues raised, 4 much confusion still exists concern-
ing some of the more critical issues. 5
The court's power to disqualify attorneys for a conflict of interest
stems from the district court's duty to regulate the conduct of attorneys
practicing before it.6 When determining whether a challenged repre-
far too great to leave room for even the slightest doubt concerning the ethical
propriety of a lawyer's representation in a given case." Id. at 571. See generally
Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020, 1027 (5th
Cir.) (disqualification is imposed because it would be "grossly unfair to permit
an attorney to reveal confidences of his former client," and disqualification en-
courages communication between the attorney and client and preserves the in-
tegrity of the judicial system in the eyes of the public), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895
(1981). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 ("Confidenti-
ality of Information") (1983); id. Rule 1.9 ("Conflict of Interest: Former Cli-
ent"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1979) ("A
Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client"); id. Canon 5
("A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a
Client"); id. Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even The Appearance of
Impropriety").
3. The issues raised are as follows: a) Are communications between a party
and the challenged attorney "privileged"?; b) Is the challenged representation
adverse to the interests of a party whose communications are privileged?; c) Is
there a substantial relationship between the current representation and the le-
gally protected relationship?; d) What evidence establishes the existence of a
substantial relationship?; e) Which party has the burden of proving the existence
of a substantial relationship?; f) What is the effect of proof of the existence of a
substantial relationship?; g) If an individual attorney in a firm has a conflict of
interest, must the entire firm be vicariously disqualified?
For a discussion of each of the issues involved, see infra notes 35 (is commu-
nication privileged?), 44-54 (substantial relationship) & 131-216 (vicarious dis-
qualification) and accompanying text.
4. The courts agree upon several propositions. The "substantial relation-
ship test" is the proper test for deciding whether an attorney should be directly
disqualified for a conflict of interest. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying
text. The moving party bears the burden of proving the existence of a substan-
tial relationship between the current and previous representations. See infra note
54 and accompanying text. Proof of a substantial relationship results in a pre-
sumption of disclosed confidences between the client and attorney. See infra
notes 55-60 and accompanying text. Disqualification of any attorney in a firm
for a conflict of interest subjects other attorneys at the firm of the disqualified
attorney to potential vicarious disqualification. See infra notes 131-41 and ac-
companying text. Vicarious disqualification is accomplished by application of a
presumption of shared confidences. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying
text.
5. The courts are split over a number of issues. See infra note 53 and ac-
companying text (What evidence proves a substantial representation?), notes
59-130 and accompanying text (Is the presumption of disclosed confidences re-
buttable?), notes 131-91 and accompanying text (Whether the presumption of
shared confidences is rebuttable?) & notes 192-216 and accompanying text (Can
a firm shield attorneys from vicarious disqualification by employing
"screening"?).
6. See Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir.
1975) ("courts have not only the supervisory power but also the duty and re-
3
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sentation is permissible, the courts generally discuss the standards sug-
gested by the American Bar Association (ABA). 7 Practically every
federal court recognizes that the ABA has established the proper stan-
dards of conduct for attorneys practicing before the court.8 Although
the ABA standards carry great weight in a court's examination of an at-
torney's conduct, "[t]he scope of such an inquiry. . . should encompass
more than the ABA [standards]." 9 The courts also rely upon principles
of trustee, fiduciary and agency law.' 0
sponsibility to disqualify counsel for unethical conduct prejudicial to his adver-
saries"); see also Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1984); Trust
Corp. of Mont. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1983); Central
Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 992 (8th Cir.
1978); Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Ott, 489 F.2d 872, 874 (7th Cir. 1973); Richardson v. Hamilton
Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973);
E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 376 (S.D. Tex. 1969). That the
court possesses the power to disqualify counsel for a conflict of interest has been
recognized for nearly 100 years. See generally Brown v. Miller, 286 F. 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1923) (attorney disqualified); In re Boone, 83 F. 944 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897)
(attorney disbarred).
7. For a discussion of how the courts apply the ABA standards, see infra
notes 28-43, 49-50 & 138-41 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 846-47 (1st Cir. 1984) (rule
4(d) of the Rules of the United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire adopts the Code); IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 279 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1978) (rule 6 of the Rules of the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey adopts the Code to govern attorney conduct); Central Milk Prod.
Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 993 (8th Cir. 1978) (Code car-
ries great weight in a court's examination of an attorney's conduct); NCK Org. v.
Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 129 n.2 (2d Cir. 1976) (Code is recognized by federal
courts in Second Circuit); Kadish v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 548
F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (Code is appropriate guideline for conduct
of attorneys admitted to practice before the district court in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois); Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744,
762 n.62 (D.D.C. 1981) (Code has been adopted by the D.C. Circuit as the ap-
propriate guidelines for conduct of attorneys practicing before the courts in the
District of Columbia); Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1315
n.5 (D. Hawaii 1975) (rule 1(g) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Court for the District of Hawaii adopts the Code); cf Sutton, supra
note *, at 501 & n.1 1 (the Code's disciplinary rules have been adopted by statute
or court rules in every state); Comment, Disqualification of Counsel. Adverse Interests
and Revolving Doors, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 200 n.8 (1981). But cf. Little & Rush,
Resolving Conflict Between Professional Ethics Opinions and Antitrust Laws, 15 GA. L.
REV. 341 (1981) (strict enforcement of the Code could lead to potential antitrust
actions against the ABA and local Bar Associations); Sutton, supra note *, at 515
(the Code was never intended to provide procedural rules for deciding disquali-
fication motions).
9. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976)
(citing International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1293 (2d Cir. 1975);
J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1359-60 (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein,
J., concurring); Handelman v, Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
10. See, e.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 567 F.2d 225
(2d Cir. 1977). In Fund of Funds, the court of appeals stated, "While we explicitly
place reliance on [the Code], the import of our decision was to safeguard against
466 [Vol. 30: p. 463
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In determining whether to disqualify a challenged attorney for a
conflict of interest, the courts often apply two presumptions: the pre-
sumption of "disclosed confidences" and the presumption of "shared
confidences."" The courts apply the presumption of disclosed confi-
dences to disqualify an attorney who undertakes an adverse representa-
tion against a former client. The presumption of disclosed confidences
generally is irrebuttable. The courts apply the presumption of shared
confidences to disqualify vicariously an attorney who undertakes a rep-
resentation adverse to the interests of a former client of an attorney with
whom the disqualified attorney is, or was, associated. The presumption
of shared confidences might be rebuttable, depending upon the factual
situation surrounding the motion for disqualification. Because subtle
distinctions in the situations surrounding such motions often are deter-
minative in the outcome of the motions, the law of attorney disqualifica-
tion for conflict of interest is fact-sensitive, intricate, and confused.
Unless some consistent thread can be found throughout the re-
ported opinions much confusion is bound to exist concerning the appro-
priate legal standards governing motions to disqualify counsel for a
conflict of interest. Whether the presumption of "disclosed confi-
dences" is ever rebuttable is a matter of growing controversy among the
courts.1 2 Additionally, the courts often disagree as to what circum-
stances render the presumption of "shared confidences" rebuttable and
indirect breach of 'the lawyer's [fiduciary] duty of absolute fidelity..... ' " Id. at
234 (quoting Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir.
1975)). The court added in a footnote: "In New York, as elsewhere, it is beyond
doubt that a lawyer is bound to conduct himself as a fiduciary or trustee of his or
her client's interests, and that he or she must exercise the utmost good faith,
honesty, integrity and fidelity." Id. at 233 n.16. The concept that the attorney is
the "fiduciary," "trustee," or "agent" of the client has been discussed in many
other decisions. See, e.g., Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386(2d Cir. 1976) (trustee or fiduciary); Hafter v. Farkas, 498 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir.
1974) (trustee or fiduciary); Brinkley v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 485 F.2d
1283, 1286 (10th Cir. 1973) (agent); Hensley v. United States, 281 F.2d 605, 607
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (agent); Rothman v. Wilson, 121 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir.
1941) (agent); see generally Spector v. Mermelstein, 361 F. Supp. 30, 38 n.15(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (listing cases where attorney found to be fiduciary), aff'd in part
and remanded in part, 485 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1973); cf Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir.) (attorney's obligation to cli-
ent goes "far beyond the principles of agency"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
See also Note, Sanctions for Attorney's Representation of Conflicting Interests, 57 COLUM.
L. REV. 994 (1957) ("Since lawyers are fiduciaries in the highest sense, the duty
to refrain from representing conflict interests applies to them with special
force.") (footnote omitted).
11. For a discussion of the presumptions, see infra notes 55-130 (disclosed
confidences) & 131-216 (shared confidences) and accompanying text. For a
brief discussion of the difference between the two presumptions, see Comment,
The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 682
n.24 (1980).
12. For a discussion of the controversy over whether the presumption of
disclosed confidences is rebuttable, see infra notes 59-130 and accompanying
text.
NOTE
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as to what a challenged attorney must prove in order to rebut the pre-
sumption.' 3 The latter question raises the issue of whether a law firm
can "screen" its attorneys to avoid vicarious disqualification.'
4
This note examines the recent cases on attorney disqualification for
a conflict of interest and proposes to resolve much of the confusion ex-
isting in this area of the law. The note traces the history of the problem,
beginning with the first major case in the area, TC. Theatre Corp. v.
Warner Brothers Pictures.15 Particular attention is focused upon the Sev-
enth Circuit "Quintet," a series of five cases decided by the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals over the past six years. 16 Armstrong v. McAlpin 17 is
also discussed with some detail.
As motions for disqualification probably will arise more frequently
in the coming years unless unforeseeable circumstances reverse the cur-
rent trend toward larger firms and government apprenticeships, 18 this
13. For a discussion of the presumption of shared confidences, see infra
notes 131-216 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of whether a firm can avoid vicarious disqualification of
its attorneys by employing screening procedures, see infra notes 192-216 and
accompanying text.
15. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). For a discussion of TC. Theatre, see
infra notes 46-51 & 56-58 and accompanying text.
16. From August 16, 1979 to September 16, 1983, the Seventh Circuit de-
cided a series of five appeals of district court decisions on motions to disqualify
counsel based on a conflict of interest. In this note, the five appeals will be
collectively referred to as the Seventh Circuit Quintet. For a discussion of the
Seventh Circuit Quintet, see infra notes 61-99, 144-48, 151-63, 176-77 & 182-
202 and accompanying text. See generally Peterson, supra note 1 (analysis of four
of the cases within the Quintet).
17. 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
18. See Jenkins, Working Both Sides of the Court, STUDENT LAw., Feb. 1977, at
34 (notes that the turnover of government attorneys into private practice is sub-
stantial); Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 GEO.
L.J. 1025, 1026 n.6 (1977) (government attorneys that enter private practice
may face ethical conflicts in representing "private clients in matters which the
attorney handled while a government employee"); Comment, supra note 11 (as
the average size of American law firms continues to grow, so does the likelihood
of a potential conflict of interest).
In addition to the probability that parties will continue to file disqualifica-
tion motions with equal or greater frequency because of the potential for in-
creased frequency of actual conflicts of interest, there is a growing concern
within the judiciary that such motions are being interposed for tactical reasons
such as delay. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979)
(courts are becoming reluctant to disqualify counsel because motions to disqual-
ify often are interposed solely for the tactical purpose of causing delay) (citing
Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1977);J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vander-
bilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein,J., concurring)); International
Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1289 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Such moves and
countermoves by adversaries appear to have become common tools of the litiga-
tion process."); cf. Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 848 (1st Cir. 1984) ("dis-
qualification motions can be tactical in nature, designed to harass opposing
counsel"). It is suggested that if uniform standards existed for consistently
resolving the many issues involved in disqualification motions, then the delay
468 [Vol. 30: p. 463
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note concludes that there is a growing need for a uniform body of law in
this area to benefit the public,' 9 the bench, 20 and the bar.2 ' The best
which currently is produced by such motions would be reduced and the desira-
bility of raising such motions would subside accordingly.
19. The public needs a uniform body of law in the area of attorney disquali-
fication for a conflict of interest because potential clients must be able to select
their attorneys freely and without fear that their attorney will be disqualified
from the representation at some later time. See Note, supra note 10, at 1000. If
members of the public knew precisely what obligations an attorney owes to them
as well as to former clients, they would be saved from the timely and costly pro-
cess of retaining new counsel after proceedings already have begun. See Com-
ment, supra note *, at 164 (early recognition of the conflict could avoid these
harms to the clients). See also Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689
F.2d 715, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1982) (substitute counsel may not be able to "master
the nuances of the legal and factual matters late in the litigation of a complex
case") (quoting Comment, The Availability of the Work Product of a Disqualified Attor-
ney: What Standard?, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1630-35 (1979)); Peterson, supra
note 1, at 400-01 (litigant will suffer monetary as well as psychological hardship
from increased legal fees, loss of trial momentum, and necessity of obtaining
new counsel with whom the litigant has never worked); Comment, supra note *,
at 164 (client faces delay and the added expense of hiring new counsel who may
not have adequate time to prepare the case); Comment, supra note 8, at 206
("[d]isqualification ... may subject both the client and the disqualified attorney
to significant hardships") (footnote omitted); Comment, supra note 11, at 679
(disqualification subjects client to higher costs); cf. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v.
First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, 399 (7th Cir. 1978) ("substitute counsel should
not be allowed to make use of the legal memoranda and loan file analyses which
never should have been prepared"). But see Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur An-
dersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 227 n.3, 236 (2d Cir. 1977) (the client need not
necessarily lose the work product of the disqualified attorney; plaintiffis com-
plaint will not be dismissed merely because his counsel was disqualified for a
conflict of interest).
Additionally, it is suggested that if the courts are able to dispose of such
motions without much delay, the desireability of interposing such a motion for
tactical reasons would be tempered and clients would be saved the expense of
defending against such motions. This is so because there is little to be gained by
interposing a motion for the purpose of delay when the court is able to dispose
of the motion through a summary proceeding.
20. It is suggested that the bench is in need of a uniform body of law in the
area for reasons ofjudicial economy. First, if a uniformly accepted body of law
controlled the courts' decisions on motions for attorney disqualification for a
conflict of interest, district courts could waste less time determining what is the
proper law to be applied, and they could concentrate their efforts on deciding
such motions on the merits. Secondly, it is suggested that once a uniform body
of law existed there would be less need for decisions by the appellate courts, as
the district courts would be able to determine properly the correct rule in the
first place, and litigants would be less willing to waste the cost of an appeal when
an adverse outcome reasonably could be expected.
21. If an attorney is disqualified for a conflict of interest, it is likely that the
client will refuse to pay for the attorney's services. Comment, supra note 8, at
206 (disqualification subjects attorney to significant economic hardships); Note,
supra note 10, at 1000 (lawyer suffers direct financial loss or incurs the dissatis-
faction of the client). Additionally, disqualification tends to cast a shadow upon
an attorney's otherwise untarnished reputation. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago
Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 1982) ("granting of a dis-
qualification motion all too often impairs the reputation of the disqualified firm
19851 NOTE 469
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way to meet this growing need would be a United States Supreme Court
decision addressing the issues involved. The Supreme Court, however,
has consistently denied certiorari in such cases.2 2 In fact, the Court only
has granted certiorari twice, declaring that the federal courts of appeals
lack jurisdiction to entertain interlocutory appeals both from the denial
of disqualification in civil litigation2 3 and from the grant of disqualifica-
or attorney"); Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d
1020, 1025 n.6, 1027 (5th Cir.) (attorney is subjected to loss of both reputation
and fees), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981); Government of India v. Cook Indus.,
569 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1978) (Mansfield, J., concurring) (attorney's reputa-
tion will "needlessly" suffer unless he is given a chance to clear his name); E.Z.
Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., No. 4-81-92 (D. Minn. Nov. 9, 1983) (attorney's rep-
utation may be blemished with an "undeserved and unfair stigma"). It is sug-
gested that if a uniform, unambiguous standard existed for deciding motions to
disqualify attorneys for a conflict of interest, then attorneys could make an intel-
ligent preliminary determination as to whether to accept a retainer.
The fact that disqualification tarnishes an attorney's reputation is especially
disconcerting because, in many cases, the court expressly will state that the at-
torney's conduct was not "truly" unethical; yet, the attorney still will be disquali-
fied. See, e.g., Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713, 716 (7th Cir.
1977) (disqualified firm is innocent of any wrongdoing); Richardson v. Hamilton
Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385 (3d Cir. 1972) (disqualified attorney acted "in
good faith and had the best interests of [the plaintiffs] at heart"); cert. denied, 411
U.S. 986 (1973); Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441,
442 (9th Cir. 1966) (court recognized the disqualified attorney's "good faith in
resisting disqualification"), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967); United States v.
Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1964) (disqualified attorney was neither
"guilty of any intention [sic] wrong, nor has his conduct been such as to suggest
any turpitude"); Motor Mart, Inc. v. SAAB Motors, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 156, 158
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("no breach of good conduct" by the disqualified attorney) (em-
phasis in original); Allied Realty, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 283 F. Supp. 464,
466, 470 (D. Minn. 1968) (court expressed that the disqualification should not
be viewed as attacking or impugning the attorney's character or integrity), afd,
408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969); W.E. Bassett Co. v.
H.C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821, 825 (D. Conn. 1961) (the case is not one of
"irresponsible conduct or contumacy" on the part of the disqualified attorneys),
aftd, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962), cf. Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson &
Co., 567 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Compliance or noncompliance with the
Canons of Ethics frequently do not involve morality or venality, but differences
of opinions among honest men over the ethical propriety of conduct.").
22. See, e.g., Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 454 U.S.
895 (1981); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 439 U.S. 955 (1978);
Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 411 U.S. 986 (1973); Allied Realty, Inc. v.
Exchange Nat'l Bank, 396 U.S. 823 (1969); Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. United States
Dist. Court, 389 U.S. 820 (1967); Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
A decision by a district court granting or denying disqualification of counsel and
the determination of a court of appeals in such a matter are not included in the
mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See generally 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1258 (1982). Therefore, if any review by the Supreme Court is to oc-
cur, it must be by grant of certiorari.
23. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981). See also
Annot., 44 A.L.R. FED. 709 (1979) (analyzes cases in which the appealability of
orders granting or denying motions to disqualify counsel has been discussed).
Before the Supreme Court decided Firestone, the circuits were split concern-
ing whether a federal court of appeals had jurisdiction to entertain an interlocu-
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tion in criminal litigation. 2 4 In the absence of a Supreme Court deci-
sion, the lower courts must resolve the confusion on their own.
This note represents an attempt to relieve some of the confusion
currently existing among the courts as to the proper standards for de-
ciding motions to disqualify counsel for a conflict of interest.
tory appeal of a district court's decision on a motion to disqualify counsel based
on a conflict of interest. See 449 U.S. at 373 n.10 (listing cases representing
views of 11 circuits on issue of whether federal courts of appeals have jurisdic-
tion to entertain interlocutory appeals of denials of disqualification: six circuits
holding no jurisdiction exists and five circuits finding jurisdiction). The
Supreme Court's decision in Firestone expressly reserved any decision as to
whether jurisdiction exists to hear interlocutory appeals of orders granting dis-
qualification in federal civil actions and orders granting or denying disqualifica-
tion in federal criminal actions. Id. at 372 n.8. When the circumstances warrant
review, there is precedent supporting the use of a petition to obtain review of an
unappealable order under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982). See Cord
v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1964) (citing Olympic Refining Co. v.
Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1964)); Hartley Pen Co. v. United States
Dist. Ct., 287 F.2d 324, 328-29 (9th Cir. 1961); see also Firestone, 449 U.S. at 378-
79 n.13 ("in the exceptional circumstances for which it was designed, a writ of
mandamus from the court of appeals might be available"); Chugach Elec. Ass'n
v. United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1966) (citing Cord). But see
IBM Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (§ 1651
"may not be used as a substitute for an authorized appeal ... where . . . the
statutory scheme permits appellate review ...on appeal from the final judg-
ment") (quoting United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S.
196, 203 (1945)).
Additionally, the courts of appeals have discretionary jurisdiction over an
issue certified by the district court as "a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate ap-
peal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the liti-
gation .... ." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). See IBM Corp. v. United States, 480
F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc). In IBM, the court rejected the petitioner's
claim that § 1292(b) provided jurisdiction, because (1) the district court had not
certified that a controlling question of law was involved and (2) the appeal was
not made directly to the Supreme Court as the statute directed. Id. at 296. The
court did not state whether § 1292(b) could be used to obtain appellate review
by the Supreme Court if the district court had so certified. Id. at 295-97. See also
Firestone, 449 U.S. at 378-79 n.13 ("if dissatisfied with the result in the District
Court and absolutely determined that it will be harmed irreparably, a party may
seek to have the question certified for interlocutory appellate review"); Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800, 805 (2d Cir.
1974) (en banc) (discusses various cases where jurisdiction was premised on dif-
ferent statutes).
Although certification technically is available, it is suggested that the court
probably will refuse to certify an issue if the court already has determined that
the challenged representation is not improper.
24. Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051 (1984). In Flanagan, the
Court noted that it had reserved judgment upon those issues in Firestone, and
said: "We decide today that a District Court's pretrial disqualification of defense
counsel in a criminal prosecution is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 [(1982)]." Id. at 1052. Later in its opinion, the Court noted that the
policy supporting § 1291 "is at its strongest in the field of criminal law." Id. at
1054 (quoting United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 265
(1982)).
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II. ADVERSE SUBSEQUENT REPRESENTATION
A. Direct Disqualification of the Attorney Who Represented the Former Client
A potential conflict of interest arises whenever an attorney under-
takes a representation of a client whose interests are adverse to those of
one of the attorney's former clients.2 5 This note shall refer to such a
situation as "adverse subsequent representation." The potential con-
flict of interest arises from the attorney's dual obligations: (1) to repre-
sent his current client to the best of his ability, 2 6 and (2) to "preserve
the confidences and secrets of [his former] client."'2 7 The attorney's
obligations to his current and former client are set out in both the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Code)28 and in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules).2 9
Canons 4,30 5,31 and 932 of the Code are implicated whenever an
25. See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R. 2d 1243 (1957) (discussing the propriety
of an attorney undertaking an adverse subsequent representation).
26. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1979) ("A
Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Cli-
ent"); id. Canon 6 ("A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently"); id.
Canon 7 ("A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of
the Law"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1983) ("Con-
flict of Interest: General Rule"). The comments to rule 1.7 state that an attor-
ney's loyalty to a client is impaired when the attorney "cannot consider,
recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because
of the lawyer's other responsibilities [to another client] or interests." Id. com-
ment, 3. The attorney's loyalty to the client is impaired because "[t]he conflict
...forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client." Id.
In addition to the ABA standards, it is suggested that principles of fiduciary,
trustee, and agency law also require an attorney to exercise a high degree of
loyalty toward his clients. For a discussion of how the courts have applied such
principles to protect former clients, see supra note 10.
27. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1979) ("A
Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client"); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983) ("Conflict of Interest: For-
mer Client"). The comments to rule 1.9 provide in pertinent part: "Information
acquired by a lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently
be used by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client." Id. comment, 3. For
a further discussion of rule 1.9, see infra notes 41 & 43. For a discussion of cases
holding that the attorney's obligation to his former client stems from principles
of fiduciary, trustee, and agency law, see supra note 10.
28. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979). For a discussion
of the applicable sections of the Code, see infra notes 30-33, 35-40, 43, 138-39 &
142 and acompanying text.
29. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983). For a discussion of
the applicable sections of the Model Rules, see infra notes 34, 41-43, 141-42,
153, 181 & 199 and accompanying text.
30. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1979) ("A
Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client").
31. Id. Canon 5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional
Judgement on Behalf of a Client").
32. Id. Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Profes-
sional Impropriety").
472 [Vol. 30: p. 463
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attorney undertakes an adverse subsequent representation. 3 3 Model
Rule 1.9 is implicated as well.3 4 The courts have interpreted Canon 4 to
prohibit an attorney from undertaking an adverse subsequent represen-
tation in which he might reveal "confidences" or "secrets" of the former
client.3 5 The policies behind Canon 4 are to encourage communication
33. See, e.g., Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Co., 646 F.2d
1020, 1027 (5th Cir. 1981) (when an attorney undertakes an adverse subsequent
representation, the representation could result in a violation of Canon 4); Trone
v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980) (adverse subsequent representation
implicates Canons 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9); International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527
F.2d 1288, 1291 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Under Canon 4 . . . a lawyer may not accept
employment against a former client where the matter is substantially related to
the subject-matter of his earlier representation.") (footnote omitted) (citing
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-5 (1970); id. DR 4-101(B));
Emle Ind. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973) (the considerations
of Canon 4 "require application of a strict prophylactic rule to prevent any pos-
sibility . . . that confidential information acquired from a client during a previ-
ous relationship may subsequently be used to the client's disadvantage.");
Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1384 (3d Cir. 1972) (adverse
subsequent representation might violate principles underlying Canon 4); Telos
v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1316-17 (D. Hawaii 1975) (Canon 9
requires disqualification where an adverse subsequent representation raises the
appearance of impropriety); Motor Mart, Inc. v. SAAB Motors, Inc., 359 F.
Supp. 156, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (adverse subsequent representation should be
avoided to preserve ethical standards of Canon 4). See also MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 legal background (Proposed Final Draft, May
30, 1981) (citing decisions applying Canons 4, 5, and 9 in situations of adverse
subsequent representation); Comment, supra note 11, at 681 (the "chief ethical
concern" with adverse subsequent representation is addressed in Canon 4).
34. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983) ("Conflict
of Interest: Former Client"). For the text of rule 1.9, see infra note 43 for a
further discussion of rule 1.9, see infra notes 41 & 43 and accompanying text.
35. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1979).
The disciplinary rule defines "confidences" as "information protected by the
attorney-client privilege .... " Id. DR 4-101 (A). The disciplinary rule defines
"secrets" as "information gained in the professional relationship that the client
has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrass-
ing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client." Id.
Generally, the controlling question in determining whether a communica-
tion is privileged is "whether the client reasonably understood the conference to
be confidential." Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 849 (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 91 at 189 (1972)). Cf Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d
246, 250 (2d Cir. 1977) (client must show that attorney was in position where he
could have received "information which his former client might reasonably have
assumed the attorney would withhold").
The attorney-client privilege protects communications between a client and
his attorney against future disclosure by the attorney. C. MCCORMICK, EvI-
DENCE, §§ 88-91 (1972). An attorney-client relationship need never have ex-
isted, however, for a court to find that a party's communications with an attorney
were privileged. For example, preliminary communications made to the attor-
ney during an initial consultation are privileged. See, e.g., Arden v. State Bar, 52
Cal. 2d 310, 341 P.2d 6 (1959) (per curiam) (privilege exists even though client
never formally employed attorney); In re Dupont's Estate, 60 Cal. App. 2d 276,
140 P.2d 866 (1943) (if privilege depended on whether attorney accepted re-
tainer after hearing facts of case, no potential client would consult with un-
19851 NOTE 473
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between an attorney and his client3 6 and to protect the fiduciary rela-
retained attorneys). But see In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d
83, 90 (5th Cir. 1976) (the duties of loyalty and confidentiality do not arise in the
absence of an attorney-client relationship). The privilege might exist even
though the attorney gratuitously advises the client or where a third party pays
the attorney's fees. C. MCCORMICK, supra § 88. Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1318-21 (7th Cir.) (privilege extended to
Kerr-McGee because the nationwide association to which Kerr-McGee belonged
was a client of the challenged attorney), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
Additionally, the privilege can arise even when a client consults an attorney
in a "particular transaction ... which could have been handled on the client's
behalf by a layman." NCK Org. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1976)
(quoting Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1964)). Cf Cord v. Smith,
338 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1964). In Cord, the court stated that "[c]lients repose
special confidence in, and retain their lawyers because they are lawyers. They
are entitled to expect that their lawyers will act as they are supposed to act,
without quibble as to what particular services may have been technically legal
services." Id. at 524. If a party reveals confidences to a person who happens to
be an attorney and the party did not intend to consult with the person as an
attorney, however, the confidences will not be protected by the court. C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra, § 88.
Confidential information remains privileged after the attorney-client rela-
tionship is terminated. American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125,
1128 (5th Cir. 1971); In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 953 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897). See also
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(b) (1983). There is ample
case support to sustain the proposition that the privilege is not nullified if the
confidential information or communication becomes or is available elsewhere.
See, e.g., Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 849 (1st Cir. 1984) (privilege exists
"without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that others
share the knowledge.") (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 4-4 (1979)); NCK Org. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1976) (privi-
lege exists even though an attorney received information from sources other
than client) (citing H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 135 (1953)); Handelman v. Weiss,
368 F. Supp. 258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (privilege exists although the privileged
information is freely available to public); Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622, 630
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (fact that present client possesses all information obtained by
his attorney from his former client does not suspend the privilege). The Model
Rules, however, permit an attorney to reveal otherwise privileged information in
the course of an adverse subsequent representation "when the information has
become generally known." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.9(b) (1983). While the Model Rules advocate a more liberal view of the attor-
ney-client privilege where the former client's confidences have become available
publicly, they expand the concept of confidentiality in other areas. Id. code com-
parison, 2 (confidentiality restriction applies "to all information about a client
'relating to the representation,' " thus, avoiding "the constricted definition of
'confidence' that appears in some decisions").
Because an attorney is obligated to protect both confidences and secrets of
a former client, the scope of the attorney's obligation to his former client ex-
tends beyond the scope of the evidentiary privilege. See NCK Org. v. Bregman,
542 F.2d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1975)).
36. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1979) ("A
client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer
must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his cli-
ent."); see also Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Canon 4 encourages a client to discuss his problems freely and in depth with his
attorney without fear that the information might later be used against the client);
474 [Vol. 30: p. 463
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tionship between the attorney and client.3 7 Canon 5 is concerned with
the attorney's obligation to represent his current client.3 8 Canon 5 is
implicated because the attorney might be forced to compromise his cur-
rent client's interests in order to protect his former client's confi-
dences.3 9 The policy behind Canon 9 is to promote public trust in the
legal profession. 40 Model Rule 1.9 encompasses the policies of Canon
4.41
Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1384 (3d Cir. 1972) ("ra-
tionale underlying Canon 4 is the principle that a client should be encouraged to
reveal to his attorney all possibly pertinent information").
37. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1979)
("Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the
proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of
confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him.").
38. See id. EC 5-1 ("The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exer-
cised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of
compromising influences and loyalties.").
39. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 229 (6th
Cir. 1978) ("disqualification would be premised upon the possibility that preex-
isting loyalties to one client may cause him, the attorney, to temper his represen-
tation of the other"); Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir.
1973) ("out of excess of good faith, a lawyer might bend too far in . . . re-
fraining from seizing a legitimate opportunity for fear that such a tactic might
give rise to an appearance of impropriety").
40. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-1 (1979). EC
9-1 states: "Continuation of the American concept that we are to be governed
by rules of law requires that the people have faith that justice can be obtained
through out legal system. A lawyer should promote public confidence in our
system and in the legal profession." Id.
The origin of the view that the attorney owes an obligation to the public to
protect the confidences of his clients is elusive. Today, however, there is little
question that the view is part and parcel of the judicial system. The American
Bar Association long has recognized the attorney's obligation to the public at
large, and has promulgated the view in the Canons of Professional Ethics, the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. See generally R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 4 (1970 ed.) ("The Code is in-
tended to guide the lawyer in carrying out his duty to society."). For a discus-
sion of the impact of the ABA standards upon a court's ruling on a motion for
disqualification of counsel for a conflict of interest, see supra notes 8-9 and ac-
companying text.
41. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983). The
Code comparison for rule 1.9 states:
There is no counterpart to Rule 1.9(a) or (b) in the Disciplinary
Rules of the Code. The problem addressed in Rule 1.9(a) sometimes
has been dealt with under the rubric of Canon 9 of the Code, which
provides that "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropri-
ety." EC 4-6 states that "the obligation of a lawyer to preserve the con-
fidences and secrets of his client continues after the termination of his
employment."
Id. code comparison, 1.
See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 4-101(A) legal back-
ground (Alternative Draft/Code of Professional Responsibility Format, May 30,
1981) (" 'Confidential information' refers to information relating to the repre-
sentation of a client."); Kutak, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct: A
13
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While Canons 4, 5, and 9 provide the courts with some guidance in
deciding whether to permit an adverse subsequent representation, the
Code does not expressly prohibit such representations. 4 2 It is suggested
that it is a result of the Code's failure to address this issue that the courts
have found it so difficult to agree upon the proper standards for decid-
ing motions to disqualify counsel for undertaking an adverse subsequent
representation. Some relief may be in sight, however, as the Model
Rules expressly prohibit such representations under specified
circumstances.
43
New Battle of New Orleans?, THE NEBRASKA TRANSCRIPT Dec./Jan. 1983, at 6. Mr.
Kutak, the chairman of the ABA committee that drafted the Model Rules, stated:
[Tihe starting point of the Model Rules is expansion of the scope of the
general obligation. The Model Rules do not use the existing Code clas-
sification of "confidences" and "secrets" and the related distinction re-
garding information "embarrassing" to the client. The Model Rules
assume that clients initially expect that all information relating to the
representation will be protected. With regard to the exceptions to the
principle of confidentiality, the Model Rules, like the 1969 Code, like
every predecessor code, and like every scholar who has written on the
issue, recognize that the general obligation of confidentiality has outer
limits where transcendant values must prevail over secrecy.
Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 Code compari-
son, 1 (1983). The Code comparison reveals that while the Code failed to
address directly the problem of an adverse subsequent representation, the
courts have dealt with the problem "under the rubric of Canon 9." Id. The
Code comparison suggests that the courts also have relied upon EC 4-6 when
addressing the problem. EC 4-6 provides in pertinent part: "[T]he obligation
of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client continues after
the termination of his employment." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY EC 4-6 (1979), quoted in MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 9
Code comparison, 1 (1983). See generally Comment, supra note *, at 168-70
(discussing application of the Code to situations involving adverse subsequent
representation).
43. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983). Rule 1.9
provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially re-
lated matter in which that person's interests are adverse to the matters
of the former client unless the former client consents after consulta-
tion; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disad-
vantage of the former client . ...
Id.
The comments indicate that Rule 1.7 should be consulted to determine
whether the interests of the present and former client are adverse. Id. comment,
1. See also Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976). In Schloetter,
the court held that adverseness is satisfied where the challenged attorney's client
is opposing the attorney's former client in the challenged representation. Id. at
710.
The Model Rules incorporate the "substantial relationship" test, which the
courts have read into the Code and its predecessor, the Canons of Ethics, for the
476
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1. The Substantial Relationship Test
Generally, the courts prohibit adverse subsequent representation
where there is a "substantial relationship" between the matters of the
prior representation of the former client and the adverse subsequent
representation. 4 4 In the absence of a substantial relationship, however,
the courts will permit an adverse subsequent representation. 4 5
past thirty years. For a discussion of the substantial relationship test, see infra
notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th
Cir. 1983) ("lawyer may not represent an adversary of his former client if the
subject matter of the two representations are 'substantially related' "); Duncan v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 646 F.2d 1020, 1028 (5th Cir.) (once
a substantial relationship is proven by the former client, the court will irrebut-
tably presume that "relevant confidential information was disclosed during the
former period of representation"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981); Schloetter v.
Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976) ("where an attorney represents a
party in a matter in which the adverse party is that attorney's former client, the
attorney will be disqualified if the subject matter of the two representations are
'substantially related' "); NCK Org. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 134 (2d Cir.
1976) (moving party need not show that confidences were actually disclosed, but
must show only that the matters are substantially related to matters in the previ-
ous representation); Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271
(2d Cir. 1975) (dictum) (disqualification is "a necessary and desireable remedy"
where adverse subsequent representation by an attorney embraces substantially
related matters to those of former representation); Canadian Gulf Lines v. Tri-
ton Int'l Carriers, 434 F. Supp. 691, 693 (D. Conn. 1976) ("The law in this Cir-
cuit is clear that 'where any substantial relationship can be shown between the
subject matter of a former representation and that of a subsequent adverse rep-
resentation, the latter will be prohibited.' "); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT DR 5-109 legal background (Alternative Draft/Code of
Professional Responsibility Format, May 30, 1981) (indicates that most courts
have adopted the substantial relationship test); Liebman, supra note *, at 998
(substantial relationship test is accepted standard for disqualification under Ca-
non 4).
45. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722
(7th Cir. 1982) (absent substantial relationship, no ethical problem exists); City
of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 208 (N.D.
Ohio 1976) (absent proof of a substantial relationship, it is "axiomatic that no
ethical problem results") (citing Canon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 398 F.
Supp. 209, 222 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 532
F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam)), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345,
354 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (attorney need not be disqualified unless a substantial rela-
tionship exists between the matters in which he represented the former client
and the matters involved in the challenged action). See also MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 legal background (Proposed Final Draft, May
30, 1981) ("The [substantial relationship] test does not prohibit subsequent ad-
verse representation in an unrelated matter.").
It is suggested that the rationale underlying the courts' use of the substan-
tial relationship test rests upon the perceived distinction between the "client"
and the "client's interests" (those interests of the client which the attorney rep-
resented). It is only after the attorney-client relationship is terminated that the
courts are able to make such a distinction because the "interests" which the at-
torney represented have become "fixed." Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528
F.2d 1384, 1386-97 (2d Cir. 1976).
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When applying the substantial relationship test, the courts most fre-
quently cite T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc.4 6 The po-
tential conflict of interest arose in T. C. Theatre because Universal, a party
defendant to Warner Brothers, was a former client of the attorney repre-
senting T.C. Theatre. 4 7 In determining whether the challenged attor-
ney should be disqualified, the court examined Canon 6 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics 4 8 (the predecessor of Canon 4 of the Code) and
Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules. 49 The court construed Canon 6 to support
the proposition that "where any substantial relationship can be shown
46. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). For other discussion of T.C. Theatre,
see Liebman, supra note *, at 1001-03; Current Decisions, Attorney and Client-
Representation of Adverse Interests Prohibited, 26 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 195 (1953-54);
Note, New Direction, supra note *, at 133-34.
The reported opinions often credit TC. Theatre as originating the substan-
tial relationship test. Prior to T.C. Theatre, however, numerous cases expounded
similar, if not identical, standards. See, e.g., Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132
(W.D. Wash. 1946) (adverse subsequent representation will not be permitted
where subsequent representation involves "same matters" as previous represen-
tation); In re Maltby, 68 Ariz. 153, 202 P.2d 902 (1949) (per curiam) (adverse
subsequent representation should not be permitted in same cause of action);
Federal Trust Co. v. Damron, 124 Neb. 655, 247 N.W. 589 (1933) (adverse sub-
sequent representation involving same subject matter as prior representation is
not permitted); People v. Gerold, 265 Il1. 448, 107 N.E. 165 (1914) (adverse
subsequent representation involving the same general matter as was involved in
the prior representation is prohibited). For a further discussion of the common
law history of disqualification of counsel from representing interests which are
adverse to a former client, see Note, Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing
Interests Adverse to Former Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917, 917-21 (1955).
A possible explanation for the fact that so many decisions cite T.C. Theatre as
the origin of the substantial relationship test may be that the prior cases all dealt
with attorneys who undertook adverse subsequent representations in the same
matters, while TC. Theatre involved matters which were not quite identical. See
TC. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 268-69. Additionally, most of the prior decisions
were state court actions and T.C. Theatre arose in a federal court. Thus, at the
very least, T.C. Theatre is the first federal decision to utilize the substantial rela-
tionship test.
47. 113 F. Supp. at 266-67. T.C. Theatre sued Warner Brothers, Universal,
and various other studios for antitrust violations. Id. at 266-68. The attorney
who T.C. Theatre retained as co-counsel had previously represented Universal
as defense counsel in other antitrust litigation. Id.
48. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1937). Canon 6 provides in
pertinent part:
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to
divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent accept-
ance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely af-
fecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has
been reposed.
Id.
49. 113 F. Supp. at 268 (citing CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6
(1951)). The court added in a footnote, "The Canons of Ethics of the American
Bar Association . . .have been adopted by a rule of this court." Id. at 268 n.4.
See also Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973). In Emle,
the court explained that Canon 4 implicitly incorporates the admonition embod-
ied in old Canon 6. Id.
478 [Vol. 30: p. 463
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between the subject matter of a former representation and that of a sub-
sequent representation, the latter will be prohibited."'50 Upon deter-
mining that a substantial relationship existed between the attorney's
previous representation of Universal and his challenged representation
of T.C. Theatre, the court disqualified the attorney from continuing to
represent T.C. Theatre. 5 '
While the courts in every circuit have applied the "substantial rela-
tionship" test for the past thirty years, 52 there are no uniformly accepted
rules for determining what facts establish a substantial relationship. 53
50. 113 F. Supp. at 268 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 271.
52. See, e.g., Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844,850 (1st Cir. 1984); Schiessle
v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994,
998 (9th Cir. 1980); Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods., 605 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir.
1979); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir.
1976); International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1291 (2d Cir. 1975);
Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975); Richardson v. Hamil-
ton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986
(1973); Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Mngmt. Corp., 216
F.2d 920, 924 (2d Cir. 1954). See generally Annot., 56 A.L.R. FED. 189 (1982)
(discusses disqualification of a firm for undertaking an adverse subsequent rep-
resentation); Annot., 51 A.L.R. FED. 678 (1981) (discusses the propriety of a
firm undertaking a representation which is adverse to the interests of a former
client of an attorney in that firm).
53. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d
751, 758 (2d Cir. 1975) (Adams, J., concurring). In Silver Chrysler, Judge Adams
stated that "the question of a 'substantial relationship' between the two matters
is not one whose dimensions are delineated with mathematical precision." Id.
See also Industrial Parts Distrib., Inc. v. Fram Corp., 504 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Kan.
1981); Renshaw v. Ravert, 460 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1978). A perfect exam-
ple of the lack of a uniform standard among the courts for applying the substan-
tial relationship test is revealed in Industrial Parts, where the court attempted to
summarize the various decisions concerning what constitutes a substantial rela-
tionship. 504 F. Supp. at 1196-97. The court found that the Second Circuit
requires "issues" to be "identical" or "essentially the same" in order for a "sub-
stantial relationship" to exist. Id. at 1197 (citing Government of India v. Cook
Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978)). The Sixth Circuit, the court found,
requires that "matters" embraced in the two suits be substantially related, but
then noted that the circuit fails to reveal how it determines whether the matters
are substantially related. Id. (citing General Elec. Co. v. Valeron Corp., 608 F.2d
265, 267 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980)). After examining the
decisions of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, the court concluded that these cir-
cuits do not distinguish between "issues" and "matters." Id. (citing Church of
Scientology v. McLean, 615 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1980); Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978)). The
Industrial Parts court concluded:
Irrespective of the terms employed in the formulation of the standard,
the basic inquiry is whether during the former representation the attor-
ney might have acquired privileged information related to the subsequent
representation. . . . To determine whether such a possibility exists
. . . the Court must 'examine the facts, circumstances and legal issues'
of the previous representation.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Realco Servs. Inc. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867,
872 (E.D. Pa. 1979)) (further citations omitted).
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The courts do agree, however, that the movant bears the burden of
proving the existence of a substantial relationship. 54
2. The Presumption of Disclosed Confidences
The courts generally agree that once the moving party meets its
burden of establishing a substantial relationship between the current
and previous representations, the moving party gains the benefit of the
presumption of disclosed confidences-a presumption that the former
client disclosed relevant confidential information to the challenged at-
torney during the course of the previous representation. There is a split
of authority among the courts, however, whether the presumption is
rebuttable. 55
It is suggested that the Industrial Parts court failed to clarify the standard for
determining when two representations are substantially related. For a further
discussion of the confusion surrounding what constitutes a substantial relation-
ship, see Comment, supra note *, at 173-74.
The Seventh Circuit has developed a more structured test for determining
whether a substantial relationship exists. The courts in that circuit follow a
"three level inquiry" which involves (1) reconstructing the facts of the scope of
the prior legal representation; (2) determining "whether it is reasonable to infer
that the confidential information allegedly given would have been given to a
lawyer representing a client in those matters"; and (3) determining "whether
that information is relevant to the issues raised in the litigation pending against
the former client." LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 255-56
(7th Cir. 1983) (citing Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter Travesol Labs.,
Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1978)).
54. The majority of courts that have addressed the issue appear to agree
that while the moving party bears the burden of proving the existence of a sub-
stantial relationship, the courts will resolve "close questions" in the movant's
favor. See, e.g., Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), appeal
dismissed, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959). In Fleischer,
the court held that a motion to disqualify counsel for a conflict of interest should
be decided in favor of the challenged counsel "[o]nly where it is clearly discerni-
ble that the issues involved in the current case do not relate to matters in which
the attorney formerly represented the adverse party .... ." Id. at 553. The
court stated that "should the question be close, it should be resolved in favor of
the client." Id. See also Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp.
209, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (burden of proving a substantial relationship is on the
moving party but close questions "should be resolved in the movant's favor"),
affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam).
Compare Realco Servs., Inc. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 872 n.4 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (rejecting notion that doubt should be resolved in favor of disqualifica-
tion, finding "[i]t is easier to find a 'doubt' than to resolve difficult questions of
law and ethics") with IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978)
("courts have gone so far as to suggest that doubts as to the existence of an
asserted conflict of interest should be resolved in favor of disqualification") and
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (attor-
ney should be disqualified if "there is a close question as to whether particular
confidences of one former client will be pertinent to the instant case").
55. A majority of the courts have held that the presumption of disclosed
confidences is irrebuttable, and thereby have disqualified the challenged attor-
[Vol. 30: p. 463
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In TC. Theatre, Judge Weinfeld stated:
The court will assume that during the course of the former rep-
resentation confidences were disclosed to the attorney bearing
on the subject matter of the representation. It will not inquire
into their nature and extent ....
To compel the client to show . .. the actual confidential
matters previously entrusted to the attorney and their possible
value to the present client would tear aside the protective cloak
drawn about the lawyer-client relationship. For the Court to
probe further and sift the confidences in fact revealed would
require the disclosure of the very matters intended to be pro-
tected by the rule.
56
Thus, according to the T.C. Theatre court, the presumption of dis-
closed confidences is irrebutable. 5 7 As Judge Weinfeld indicated, the
ney once a substantial relationship was established. See, e.g., Kevlik v. Goldstein,
724 F.2d 844, 851 (1st Cir. 1984); Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter
Travenol Labs., 607 F.2d 186, 197 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc); Arkansas v. Dean
Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1979); Wilson P. Abraham Con-
str. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 1977); Hull v. Ce-
lanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975); Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478
F.2d 562, 570 (2d Cir. 1973); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d
1382, 1385 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); Chugach Elec. Ass'n
v. United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441, 444 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 820 (1967); Motor Mart, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 156, 157-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Some courts, however, have held that the presumption of disclosed confi-
dences is rebuttable in certain circumstances. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d
417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252,
256 (7th Cir. 1983); Lemelson v. Synergistics Research Corp., 504 F. Supp.
1164, 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing Government of India v. Cook Indus., 569
F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1978) (Mansfield, J., concurring)); see also Government of
India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 741 (2d. Cir. 1978) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring).
One other district court in the Second Circuit has followed an approach
which is contrary to the established rule that the existence of a substantial rela-
tionship requires the disqualification of the challenged attorney. See Fleischer v.
A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), appeal dismissed, 264 F.2d 515 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959). In Fleischer, the court refused to disqual-
ify the defendant's attorney even though there existed a substantial relationship
between a previous representation by the challenged attorney of the moving
party and a cause of action involved in the challenged action. 163 F. Supp. at
562. Instead of disqualifying the challenged attorney the court dismissed the
cause of action which gave rise to the conflict of interest, concluding that the
cause of action was interposed solely for the purpose of disqualifying the coun-
sel of the opposing party. Id. at 562-69.
56. 113 F. Supp. at 268-69.
57. Id. See also Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter Travenol Labs.,
607 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (T.C. Theatre "clearly contemplates
an irrebuttable presumption"); Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motor
Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975) (presumption of disclosed confidences
is irrebuttable under TC. Theatre); Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562,
571 (2d Cir. 1973) (cites T.C. Theatre for the proposition that "it is the court's
1985] NOTE
19
Silverstein: Attorney Disqualification for a Conflict of Interest in Federal C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30: p. 463
court must adopt an irrebuttable presumption in order to protect the
former client from being forced to disclose the very confidences he de-
sired to protect when he raised the motion to disqualify his former
counsel. 58
duty to order the attorney disqualified" once a substantial relationship is
proved); Liebman, supra note *, at 1001 ("at least some of Judge Weinfeld's
language effectively established a conclusive presumption of knowledge of confi-
dences on the subject of the lawyer's subsequent representation once the 'sub-
stantially related' test was met") (footnote omitted); Comment, supra note *, at
174. While Judge Weinfeld's opinion does not state expressly that there is an
irrebuttable presumption, his opinion does state that an attorney must be dis-
qualified from undertaking a challenged representation if the moving party suc-
cessfully establishes a substantial relationship between the previous and current
representations. See T.C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 268-69. Therefore, it is sug-
gested thatJudge Weinfeld's opinion should be read to state either that proof of
a substantial relationship is equivalent to proof of a conflict of interest or that
proof of a substantial relationship raises an irrebuttable presumption of a con-
flict of interest.
58. 113 F. Supp. at 269. Judge Weinfeld's reasoning seems to have been
premised upon the belief that a former client necessarily would have to reveal
the very confidences he disclosed to his former attorney in order to prove that
substantially related confidences actually were disclosed. Id. This reasoning has
been repeated by many courts in discussing the issue since TC. Theatre. See, e.g.,
NCK Org. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1976) (former client may not
be able to prove actual disclosure for fear that doing so will result in the disclo-
sure of the very confidences the client desires to protect); Hull v. Celanese
Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 570 n.8 (2d Cir. 1975) (a hearing would be self-defeating
since it would be necessary to reveal to the challenged firm in some specificity
the extent of the movant's disclosures to the challenged attorney); Realco Servs.,
Inc. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 872 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("client's confidences . . .
would end up on the public record-and perhaps on the pages of the Federal
Supplement); Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interests: Representation of Interests Adverse to
That of a Former Client, 55 B.U.L. REV. 61, 76 (1975) (court's inquiry into the
nature of disclosed confidences would undermine the purpose of disqualifica-
tion to protect the confidentiality of the attorney-client privilege).
A few courts have suggested the alternative of an in camera review of the
former client's evidence of his alleged disclosures to the challenged attorney of
substantially related confidential information. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson,
497 F.2d 602, 606 (8th Cir.) (after conducting in camera hearing, court deter-
mined that challenged attorney had not received any substantially related confi-
dences of former client), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974); Consolidated
Theatres, Inc v. Warner Bros. Circuit Mngmt. Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 926 & n.7
(2d Cir. 1954) (acknowledging possibility of in camera proceeding, but rejecting
its application in complicated cases such as the one at bar). See also Bricheno v.
Thorpe, 37 Eng. Rep. 864 (1821) ("before thus shutting up the sources of em-
ployment, it was incumbent on the Court to see that there was something more
than hypothetical mischief to be guarded against"); Note, Ethical Considerations,
supra note *, at 539 (supporting in camera proceeding, because judge is given
more flexibility to avoid disqualification where an irrebuttable presumption
would be unfair); Note, Legal Ethics-Attorney Who had Worked on Antitrust Suits for
Clients of Firm with Which he was then Associated Disqualified from Prosecuting a Similar
Suit Against Them, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1084 (1955) (supporting use of in camera
proceeding where disqualification would produce a harsh result, such as where
an attorney is prevented from practicing his specialty, especially and where the
attorney can prove that the information he received was only of a general char-
acter). But see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224
482
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Practically every court has approved of the use of an irrebuttable
presumption of disclosed confidences to decide motions to disqualify
attorneys from undertaking an adverse subsequent representation. 59
Two decisions by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a decision by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and a district court decision within
the Second Circuit, however, appear to reject the irrebuttable presump-
tion in favor of a rebuttable one.
60
a. The Seventh Circuit Decisions
In LaSalle National Bank v. County of Lake,6 ' the Seventh Circuit ac-
knowledged that an attorney should be permitted an opportunity to re-
but the presumption of disclosed confidences. LaSalle involved a
situation where an attorney, Seidler, left his position as a government
attorney and joined the private firm of Rudnick & Wolfe as an associ-
ate.6 2 A few months after Seidler joined the firm, Rudnick & Wolfe filed
suit on behalf of LaSalle National Bank against the County of Lake, Seid-
ler's former employer. 6 3 After the County moved to have both Seidler
n.3 (7th Cir.) (irrebuttable presumption should be utilized to avoid unsatisfac-
tory nature of evidence obtained in "reliance on ex parte representations made in
camera by the party seeking disqualification"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
The courts which have supported in camera proceedings overlook the fact
that the client may wish to keep his confidences from reaching the judge who is
trying the action, as well as from the opposition. See Note, supra note 46, at 926.
It is suggested that one feasible alternative might be to implement a procedure
requiring an in camera hearing to be conducted by a judge other than the judge
who is trying the action.
59. See, e.g., Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 850-51 (1st Cir. 1984) (once
the former client proves the existence of a substantial relationship, the chal-
lenged attorney must be disqualified for a conflict of interest based on the actual
or potential use of privileged information); Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Co., 646 F.2d 1020, 1028 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Once the former
client proves that the subject matters of the present and prior representations
are 'substantially related,' the court will irrebuttably presume that relevant confi-
dential information was disclosed during the former period of representation.");
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1978)
("where an attorney represents a party in a matter in which the adverse party is
that attorney's former client, the attorney will be disqualified if the subject mat-
ter of the two representations are 'substantially related' "); Silver Chrysler Plym-
outh v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975) (adopting T.C.
Theatre approach that satisfaction of the substantial relationship tests results in
disqualification without regard to further proof of actual disclosure); Emle In-
dus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 574 (2d Cir. 1973) (once the movant estab-
lishes the existence of a substantial relationship, "we need not inquire whether
[the challenged attorney] in fact had access to confidential information").
60. See Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983); LaSalle Nat'l
Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983); Government of India v.
Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978); Lemelson v. Synergistics Research
Corp., 504 F. Supp. 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
61. 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983).
62. Id. at 254.
63. Id. at 254-55. Seidler served as Assistant State's Attorney in Lake
County from 1976 until January 31, 1981. Id. at 253. While Seidler was em-
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and the firm disqualified, the district court granted the motion, and the
court of appeals affirmed. 64
The LaSalle court began its analysis of the disqualification of Seidler
and his firm by focusing upon the substantial relationship test developed
in TC. Theatre.6 5 In framing its analysis, the court stated,
The question before us in this case . . . is . . . solely whether
there is a substantial relationship between the subject matter of
the prior and present representation.
If, after evaluating the facts of this case . . . we find
that such a substantial relationship did exist, we are entitled to
presume that the attorney received confidential information
during his prior representation. 66
The court added, "This presumption, however, is a rebuttable one."'67
After considering the evidence that Seidler introduced in the dis-
trict court to rebut the presumption of disclosed confidences, the court
ployed by the County of Lake, he reviewed documents relevant to the develop-
ment of certain property which was the subject of the LaSalle litigation. Id. at
254. Seidler contended that he never wrote a legal opinion concerning the
property, but he admitted that he was exposed to several documents relating to
the property. Id.
64. Id. at 259.
65. Id. at 255 (citing TC. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)). The
court set forth the following "three-level inquiry" for determining whether a
substantial relationship exists:
First, the trial judge must make a factual reconstruction of the scope of
the prior legal representation. Second, it must be determined whether
it is reasonable to infer that the confidential information allegedly given
would have been given to a lawyer representing a client in those mat-
ters. Third, it must be determined whether that information is relevant
to the issues raised in the litigation pending against the former client.
Id. at 255-56 (citing Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter Travenol Labs.,
Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 195 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc)); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 225 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978)).
For a further discussion of the Seventh Circuit's "three-level inquiry" and of the
various tests applied by other courts to determine the existence of a substantial
relationship, see supra note 53.
66. Id. at 255-56 (citing Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir.
1976)).
67. Id. at 256 (citing Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d
715, 722 (7th Cir. 1982); Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter Travenol
Labs., 607 F.2d 186, 197 (7th Cir 1979) (en banc)). The court explained that a
strict standard of proof must be applied when determining whether the chal-
lenged attorney has rebutted the presumption, stating that "any doubts as to the
existence of an asserted conflict of interest must be resolved in favor of disquali-
fication." Id. at 257 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588
F.2d 221, 225 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978)). Additionally, the
court offered three criteria to aid the courts in deciding whether the presump-
tion has been rebutted: 1) the size of the attorney's firm; 2) the attorney's area
of specialization; and 3) the attorney's position within the firm. Id. (citing Free-
man, 689 F.2d at 723). The court did not explain how each factor should be
figured into the decision.
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of appeals concluded that the presumption was not "clearly and persua-
sively rebutted." '6 8
About six months after LaSalle was decided, another panel of the
Seventh Circuit decided Schiessle v. Stephens. 6 9 Schiessle arose from an an-
titrust suit by the plaintiff, Eleanor Schiessle, against eighteen defend-
ants, including Arthur, Carl, and Paul Swanson. 70 The act relevant to
the disqualification question was that King, a partner in the firm repre-
senting the Swanson defendants, left his firm to become a partner at the
firm representing the plaintiff.7 1 After the Swansons threatened to
move for disqualification of King's new firm, the firm filed a motion with
the district court for a declaration of qualification. 72
In affirming the district court order disqualifying King's firm from
representing Schiessle, the court of appeals found King's previous rep-
resentation of the Swansons and his current representation of Schiessle
to be substantially related. 7 3 After establishing that the two representa-
tions were substantially related, the court stated, "[W]e must determine
whether the attorney whose change of employment created the disquali-
fication issue was actually privy to any confidential information his prior
firm received from the party now seeking disqualification of his present
firm." 74 Thus, the court failed to presume irrebuttably that the Swan-
sons disclosed confidences to King, even though King had actually par-
68. Id. at 257.
69. 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983). Schiessle was decided by Circuit Judges
Wood, Coffey, and Eschenbach. Id. at 418. LaSalle was decided by Circuit
Judges Pell and Cudahy and Senior District Judge Bonsall, who was sitting by
designation. LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 253.
70. 717 F.2d at 418. The action revolved around a plan by Stephens and
the Swansons to condemn and redevelop property owned by Schiessle. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 419. The Swansons' counsel threatened to move for the disquali-
fication of Schiessle's counsel unless Schiessle agreed to dismiss the Swansons as
defendants. Id. Schiessle refused to dismiss, and filed a motion for declaration
of qualification as counsel for the plaintiff. Id.
In evaluating the evidence which the parties had submitted to the district
court, the court of appeals noted that King averred in an affidavit that he had
performed "some work on the present action" on behalf of the codefendants.
Id. The court further recognized that King's affidavit averred that he "never
filed either an appearance on behalf of the Swansons or an answer, nor did he
conduct any 'detailed investigation into the case.' " Id. In addition, the court
stated that an affidavit submitted by one of King's former partners
stands uncontradicted in its recital that King, while a partner at [his
former firm], was (1) 'partner-in-charge' of representing the [codefend-
ants] in the Schiessle litigation; (2) that King discussed the lawsuit on
four occasions with [the codefendants]; and (3) that King had taken
part in numerous discussions at [his former firm] regarding the . . .
lawsuit.
Id. at 420-21.
73. Id. at 420. The court concluded: "[T]here is no dispute that the sub-
ject matter of the prior and present representations are substantially related-
indeed the subject matter is identical." Id.
74. Id.
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ticipated in his former firm's representation of the Swansons. The
court's failure to clarify why it did not apply the irrebuttable presump-
tion of disclosed confidences creates the appearance that the court en-
dorses the repudiation of the presumption. 75
Both LaSalle and Schiessle relied heavily upon Novo Terapeutisk
Laboratorium v. Baxter Travenol Labs.76 and Freeman v. Chicago Musical In-
strument Co.. 77 Schiessle also relied upon Analytica, Inc. v. N.P.D. Research,
Inc. 78 It is suggested, however, that neither Novo, Freeman or Analytica
support the propositions for which they are relied upon in LaSalle and
Schiessle.
Novo, the first case in the Seventh Circuit Quintet, arose after an
attorney left his firm and took with him one of the firm's clients, Baxter
Travenol. 79 Novo Terapeutisk subsequently retained the attorney's for-
mer firm to represent it in a patent infringement action against Baxter
Travenol. 80 After the attorney's former firm filed a motion to appear as
counsel for Novo Terapeutisk, Baxter Travenol filed motions to disqual-
ify the former firm.8 '
Sitting en banc, the Seventh Circuit held that the challenged repre-
75. It is possible that the court failed to presume that the Swansons dis-
closed confidences to King because the minimal work which King performed on
behalf of the defendants at his former firm merely was a "peripheral representa-
tion," which courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits have recognized as falling
short of the traditional "representation" giving rise to a conflict of interest. See,
e.g., Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam) (former associate in large firm not disqualified where "no substantial
relationship existed between the pending litigation and the matters upon which
he worked for the client during his prior association"); Silver Chrysler Plym-
outh, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975) (the role
of a junior associate at a large law firm "cannot be considered 'representation'
within the meaning of T.C. Theatre Corp."). It is suggested, however, that such a
conclusion would be contrary to the precedent developed in the Seventh Circuit.
See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1318
(7th Cir.) (rejecting any legally significant distinction between "peripheral repre-
sentation" at a large firm and "representation" at a small firm) (citing Schloeter
v. Railoc, Inc., 456 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955
(1978). For a further discussion of the "peripheral representation" exception,
see infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
76. 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
77. 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982).
78. 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
79. 607 F.2d at 194.
80. Id. at 195.
81. Id. The issue in Novo was whether the court should disqualify Novo Ter-
apeutisk's counsel on the ground that Baxter Travenol's attorney might have
shared relevant confidences of Baxter Travenol with attorneys in his former
firm. See id. at 196. The court framed its role as determining "to what extent the
confidential information presumably received by [Baxter Travenol's attorney]
must be imputed to other members of [his former firm]." Id. Thus, the issue was
one of vicarious disqualification. For a further discussion of vicarious disqualifi-
cation, see infra notes 131-216 and accompanying text.
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sentation was not impermissible.8 2 Of the presumption of disclosed
confidences, the court stated, "Implicit ... in the substantial relation-
ship test is a presumption that an attorney who worked on a substan-
tially related matter received confidences in connection therewith."
83
Thus, the Novo court agreed that a presumption of disclosed confidences
arises upon proof of a substantial relationship. The court did not state
expressly, however, whether the presumption of disclosed confidences is
irrebuttable.8 4 Instead, the court proceeded to discuss the more rele-
vant issue of whether the presumption of shared confidences is rebutta-
ble.8 5 It is suggested that the court implicitly acknowledged that the
presumption of disclosed confidences is irrebuttable, because (1) the
two precedents which the court cited in its discussion of the presump-
tion of disclosed confidences both recognize such a conclusion, 86 and
(2) the court's latter discussion of the presumption of shared confi-
dences suggests that it is preferable to irrebuttably presume that a client
disclosed confidences to his attorney in a substantially related matter in
order to "avoid any unseemly inquiry into the actual details of conversa-
tion between client and counsel."
8 7
82. Id. at 197.
83. Id. at 196 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d
221, 225-26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978)).
84. After finding a substantial relationship between the firm's former repre-
sentation of Baxter Travenol and the challenged representation of Novo Ter-
apeutisk, the court proceeded to discuss the presumption of shared confidences,
leaving open the question of whether the presumption of disclosed confidences
is rebuttable. See id. at 197. The court did state, however, that if the attorney
who represented Baxter Travenol had attempted to represent Novo Ter-
apeutisk, "there is little doubt that a motion by Baxter to disqualify him would
be granted." Id.
85. Id. at 196-97. For a discussion of the Novo court's treatment of the pre-
sumption of shared confidences, see infra notes 151-63 and accompanying text.
86. See id. at 196 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588
F.2d 221, 225-26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Schloetter v. Railoc,
Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976)). In Schloetter, the court recognized in
dictum that the presumption of disclosed confidences is irrebuttable, stating that
the court will not inquire into whether client confidences were disclosed to the
attorney in the course of a former representation in a substantially related mat-
ter. 546 F.2d at 710. The Westinghouse court reached a similar conclusion two
years later. 588 F.2d at 224.
87. See 607 F.2d at 197. The court reasoned as follows:
The more difficult question is . . . whether or not the presumption
should be a rebuttable one. There are often good reasons for making
the presumption of shared confidences irrebuttable. We generally do
so at the first level (the presumption that confidences have been shared
by a client in a substantially related matter) in order to avoid any un-
seemly inquiry into the actual details of conversations between client
and counsel. In that situation, and no doubt in others, an irrebuttable
presumption may also be required by the spirit of Canon 9 ....
Id. (citations omitted). Although the court referred to the presumption which
generally is irrebuttable as a "first level" presumption of "shared" confidences,
it is suggested that the court was actually referring to what this note has termed
"the presumption of disclosed confidences." That the court described the first
NOTE 4871985]
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Like Novo, Freeman, the second case in the Quintet, also failed to
hold that the presumption of disclosed confidences is rebuttable. 88 In
Freeman, an associate of the law firm representing Chicago Musical In-
struments Co. (CMI), was formerly employed by the law firm represent-
ing Freeman. 89 Freeman's firm objected to CMI's chosen counsel,
claiming that the associate had obtained disclosed confidences during
his former association with the firm representing Freeman.9 0 Because
the proper resolution of the motion to disqualify counsel in Freeman in-
volved an issue of vicarious disqualification as opposed to direct disqual-
ification, the Freeman court did not discuss the presumption of disclosed
confidences.
The Seventh Circuit decided LaSalle approximately six months after
level presumption as "the presumption that confidences have been shared by a
client" betrays the fact that the court was referring to the presumption of dis-
closed confidences and not the presumption of shared confidences, which per-
tains to disclosures between and among different attorneys within a firm.
The Novo court added to its discussion of whether the presumption should
be rebuttable, "On the other hand, a rote reliance on irrebuttable presumptions
may deny the courts the flexibility needed to reach a just and sensible ruling on
ethical matters." Id. (citing Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975)) (quoting United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)). Neither Silver Chrysler nor Stan-
dard Oil involved the presumption of disclosed confidences, but both decisions
involved decisions that the presumption of shared confidences should be rebut-
table. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d
751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975) (presumption that an attorney formerly associated with a
firm received confidential information transmitted by a client to other attorneys
at the firm is rebuttable); United States v. Standard Oil Corp., 136 F. Supp. 345,
362 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (presumption that one attorney within an organization
shared confidences with another attorney is rebuttable and must be decided on
an ad hoc basis). Thus, insofar as the Novo court's discussion of the presumptions
of shared and disclosed confidences rejected the further application of an ir-
rebuttable presumption, it is suggested that the court rejected only the further
application of an irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences, but that the
court did not reject the further application of an irrebuttable presumption of
disclosed confidences.
88. See 689 F.2d at 722. Freeman involved the question of whether the pre-
sumption "that an attorney has knowledge of the confidences and secrets of his
[former] firm's clients is rebuttable." Id. Thus, Freeman did not involve the pre-
sumption of disclosed confidences, but turned on the court's application of the
presumption of shared confidences. For a discussion of the presumption of
shared confidences, see infra notes 131-216 and accompanying text.
89. Id. at 716-17. Freeman was represented by the firm of Dressier, Gold-
smith, Shore, Sutker & Milnamow (Dressier), while CMI retained the firm of
Hill, Van Santen, Steadman, Chiara & Simpson (Hill). Id. at 716. After CMI
retained the firm of Fitch, Even, Tabin, Flannery & Welsh (Fitch) to act as
cocounsel to the Hill firm, Freeman learned that an associate in the Fitch firm
had been an associate at the Dressler firm during the time in which the Dressier
firm was under retainer to Freeman. Id.
90. Id. at 717. CMI subsequently filed a motion requesting a declaration
that the firm be allowed to continue its representation of CMI. Id.
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Freeman.9 1 Two months after LaSalle was decided, another panel of the
Seventh Circuit decided Analytica.9 2 The Analytica court upheld the dis-
qualification of an entire firm from representing a client whose interests
were adverse to those of a former client of the firm.9 3 In so doing, the
Analytica court held that the presumption of disclosed confidences is ir-
rebuttable. 9 4 While the Analytica court cited LaSalle as support for vari-
ous propositions, the court failed to acknowledge the LaSalle court's
holding that the presumption of disclosed confidences is rebuttable. 9 5
It is suggested that insofar as the LaSalle and Schiessle courts purport
to rest their decisions upon any propositions developed in Novo or Free-
man, the decisions are unsupported by those cases. Novo implicitly rec-
ognized that the presumption of disclosed confidences is irrebuttable, 9 6
and Freeman contains no discussion whatsoever concerning the presump-
tion of disclosed confidences. 9 7 It is further suggested that Analytica fails
to support Schiessle, because Analytica, like Novo, recognizes that the pre-
sumption of disclosed confidences is irrebuttable. 98
91. LaSalle was decided on March 29, 1983, while Freeman was decided on
September 27, 1982.
92. 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983). Analytica was decided by CircuitJudges
Posner and Coffey and Senior District Judge Campbell. Id. at 1265. Circuit
Judge Coffey wrote a lengthy dissent to the opinion. Id. at 1270-80 (Coffey, J.,
dissenting). The Freeman panel also included Circuit Judges Posner and Coffey,
but was joined by Chief Judge Cummings, who wrote the court's opinion. See
Freeman, 687 F.2d at 716.
93. 708 F.2d at 1265. The case arose when Analytica retained the firm of
Schwartz & Freeman to represent it in an antitrust suit against NPD. Id. Prior to
the suit, Richard Fine, a partner in Schwartz & Freeman, had been retained by
NPD. Id. During the course of his employment by NPD, Fine obtained confiden-
tial information about the financial condition, sales trends, and management of
NPD. Id. at 1267. When Schwartz & Freeman attempted to prosecute the suit
for Analytica, NPD moved to have the firm disqualified as a result of Fine's prior
involvement with NPD. Id. at 1266.
94. Id. at 1266-68.
95. Of the presumption of disclosed confidences, the court stated:
A lawyer may not represent an adversary of his former client if the sub-ject matter of the two representations is "substantially related," which
means: if the lawyer could have obtained confidential information in
the first representation that would have been relevant in the second. It
is irrelevant whether he actually obtained such information ...
...If the "substantial relationship" test applies.. "it is not ap-
propriate for the court to inquire into whether actual confidences were
disclosed."
708 F.2d at 1266-67 (citations omitted). For a further discussion of Analytica, see
infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
96. For a discussion of the Novo court's implicit recognition that the pre-
sumption of disclosed confidences is irrebuttable, see supra notes 85-86.
97. For a discussion of Freeman, see supra notes 87-89 and accompanying
text.
98. For a discussion of Analytica, see supra notes 91-94 and accompanying
text.
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While LaSalle and Schiessle are unsupported by either Novo, Freeman,
or Analytica, and appear to be inconsistent with the implication of both
Novo and Analytica, there is an interpretation of LaSalle and Schiessle which
is consistent with the discussions of the law in Novo, Freeman, and
Analytica. It is suggested that the decisions should be read to support
the application of a rebuttable presumption of disclosed confidences
only where the qualification of the attorney who actually represented the
former client is not at issue. 99 Any other reading of the cases would be
contrary to the very precedent upon which the decisions relied.' 0 0
b. The Second Circuit Decisions
Within the Second Circuit, the only support for a rebuttable pre-
sumption of disclosed confidences can be found in a concurring opinion
by Judge Mansfield in Government of India v. Cook Industries'0 ' and in a
99. The issue in LaSalle and Schiessle was not whether the attorney who had
switched firms should be disqualified from the challenged representation against
his former client. Seidler's personal qualification to represent LaSalle National
Bank was never at issue in LaSalle as Seidler's new firm had screened Seidler
from other members of the firm who were participating in the representation.
703 F.2d at 255. Similarly, in Schiessle, King averred in his affidavit that he did
not participate in the challenged representation from the time he joined his new
firm. 717 F.2d at 419. Thus, the issue in both LaSalle and Schiessle was whether
the presumption of disclosed confidences should be rebuttable to permit other
attorneys at the firm of an attorney who switched firms to undertake a represen-
tation against a former client of the attorney who switched firms. It is suggested
that both LaSalle and Schiessle represent the proper analysis of a motion to dis-
qualify counsel vicariously as a result of confidences alleged to be possessed by
an attorney who switched firms. For a discussion of the holdings of both LaSalle
and Schiessle, see infra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
Another possible explanation for the action taken by the LaSalle court lies in
the fact that the potential conflict of interest in LaSalle arose from Seidler's pre-
vious employment by the government. See 703 F.2d at 256. Many courts faced
with similar circumstances have recognized a legally significant distinction be-
tween cases where the challenged attorney was formerly a government attorney
and situations where the attorney formerly worked at another firm. See, e.g.,
Greitzer & Locks v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 81-1379 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1982)
(former Justice Department attorney's new firm permitted to undertake repre-
sentation which attorney would have been disqualified from undertaking where
attorney was screened from rest of firm); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d
791 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam) (same; former government attorney); see also
King & Pitts, Suing a Former Client, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1983, at 22. King & Pitts
state, "Screening the attorney for the former client from the existing matter,
which will then be handled by another lawyer in the firm, is a mechanism that is
often proposed to avoid conflict of interest. Almost invariably the courts reject
it. The sole exception involves government attorneys." Id. at 23. For a discus-
sion of the difference between situations where a former government attorney is
the potential cause for disqualification and situations where disqualification is
sought because of information allegedly possessed by an attorney who switched
from one private law firm to another, see infra notes 198-99 and accompanying
text.
100. For a discussion of Novo, Freeman, and Analytica, see supra notes 79-94
and accompanying text.
101. 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978).
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district court opinion in Lemelson v. Synergistics Research Corp. 102
Government of India involved a paradigm situation in which the pre-
sumption of disclosed confidences applies: an attorney, Meeker, left one
law firm, where he represented Cook Industries, and joined another
firm, where he was assigned to represent the Government of India in its
suit against Cook Industries.10 3 In affirming the district court's disquali-
fication of Meeker, the court of appeals focused first upon whether the
two representations were substantially related. 10 4 After concluding that
they were, the court focused its inquiry on "whether Meeker's involve-
ment in the prior case was such that he would have had access to rele-
vant privileged information."' 10 5 Upon determining that the record
supported a finding that Meeker was directly involved in his firm's repre-
sentation of Cook Industries, the Second Circuit concluded that the dis-
qualification order was within the district court's discretion. 10 6 The
court of appeals based its decision on the "well established principle"
that "a court should not require proof that an attorney actually had ac-
cess to or received privileged information while representing the client
in a prior case." 10 7 Thus, the Government of India court applied the ir-
rebuttable presumption of disclosed confidences once it was convinced
that the challenged attorney had previously represented the movant in a
substantially related matter.' 0 8
102. 504 F. Supp. 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
103. 569 F.2d at 738.
104. Id. at 739-40. The court found that Meeker's prior representation of
Cook Industries and his current representation of the Government of India were
substantially related because the two representations involved the same nexus of
information. Id. The court stated, "It would be difficult to think of a closer
nexus between issues." Id. at 739.
105. Id. at 740.
106. Id. (citing Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571-72 (2d Cir.
1975); Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973); T.C.
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)).
107. Id.
108. It should be noted that the opinion in Government of India does not
expressly state that the presumption of disclosed confidences is irrebuttable.
Under traditional analysis, the court should have ended its inquiry after deter-
mining that "the district court correctly held that the issues in the prior and
present cases were substantially related." Id. The court went on, however, to
determine "whether Meeker's involvement in the prior case was such that he
would have had access to relevant privileged information." Id. This language
would seem to indicate that the court did not consider the presumption of dis-
closed confidences to be irrebuttable, despite the fact that the court also stated,
"[A] court should not require proof that an attorney had access to or received
privileged information while representing the client in a prior case." Id.
It is suggested that the Government of India court did, in fact, apply an ir-
rebuttable presumption of disclosed confidences. It is further suggested that the
above quoted language, referring to the further determination which a court
must make, referred to the determination of whether the challenged attorney
actually represented the party seeking disqualification or was merely peripher-
ally involved in the party's prior representation.
Lemelson lends further support for the proposition that Government of India
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In a brief concurring opinion to Government of India, Judge Mansfield
agreed that the district court properly disqualified the challenged attor-
ney. 10 9 Judge Mansfield, however, added:
I am reluctant to endorse the district court's unqualified state-
ment to the effect that once a substantial relationship is shown
between the subject matters of the two representations and that
the lawyer's personal role in the former representation was
more than peripheral, the presumption that the attorney had
access to confidential information in the prior relationship is
"irrebuttable" . . . .110
Judge Mansfield relied upon two prior decisions by the Second Cir-
cuit and a district court decision within the circuit to support the posi-
tion that the presumption of disclosed confidences is rebuttable."'I
Quoting the Second Circuit's statement from Silver Chrysler Plymouth v.
Chrysler Motor Co,"12 Judge Mansfield stated, "[W]hile this Circuit has
recognized that an inference may arise that an attorney formerly associ-
ated with a firm himself received confidential information transmitted by
a client to the firm, that inference is a rebuttable one."'
1 3
Three years later, in Lemelson the Southern District of New York
adopted Judge Mansfield's rebuttable presumption of disclosed confi-
applied an irrebuttable presumption of disclosed confidences. See 504 F. Supp.
at 1167. Lemelson cited only to Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion in Govern-
ment of India as support for the proposition that the presumption of disclosed
confidences is rebuttable. Id. It is suggested that the Lemelson court would have
cited to the court's opinion in Government of India if the Lemelson court believed
that Government of India supported such a proposition. As Lemelson failed to cite
to the court's opinion in Government of India, it is suggested that the Lemelson
court believed that Government of India did not repudiate the use of the irrebut-
table presumption of disclosed confidences.
Additionally, in Novo, the Seventh Circuit discussed Government of India in its
discussion of whether the presumption of shared confidences should be rebutta-
ble. Novo, 607 F.2d at 191-92. Like Lemelson, however, the Novo court discussed
only Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion, and did not cite the opinion of the
court as supporting the proposition that the presumption of disclosed confi-
dences is rebuttable. See id.
If the courts should accept that Government of India is consistent with the
continued application of an irrebuttable presumption of disclosed confidences,
then future courts and attorneys within the Second Circuit will have to find sup-
port in either Judge Mansfield's concurrence or Lemelson for rejecting the ir-
rebuttable presumption.
109. 569 F.2d at 740 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 741 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
11. Id. (citing Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d
751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975); Laskey Bros., Inc. v. Warner Bros., Inc., 224 F.2d 824,
827 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)).
112. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). For a further discussion of Silver Chrysler,
see infra notes 78-79.
113. 569 F.2d at 741 (quoting Silver Chrysler, 518 F.2d at 754) (citations
omitted).
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dences. t 14 Lemelson involved an action for breach of contract, fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty and restraint of trade. 1 5 Lemelson owned a
patent for an invention which was marketed by Synergistics. t1 6 During
the course of Synergistics' marketing of Lemelson's invention, the chal-
lenged attorney represented both Lemelson and Synergistics in various
patent infringement suits against other parties." 17 Subsequently, Syner-
gistics retained the challenged attorney to defend it in Lemelson's suit,
and Lemelson moved to disqualify the attorney on the ground that the
attorney had access to confidential information relevant to the
litigation. 118
The Lemelson court began its analysis of the disqualification motion
by invoking the substantial relationship test of TC. Theatre.119 The
court acknowledged, "It may be argued that when, as here, the attorney
was personally involved in, indeed in control of, the prior representa-
tion, there is an irrebuttable presumption of receipt of confidential in-
formation."' 20 The court concluded, however, that the "better view" is
to permit the attorney to rebut the presumption. 12 1 The district court
gave no reason for its preference and cited as authority only Judge
Mansfield's concurring opinion from Government of India.'2 2 The Lemel-
son court never applied the presumption of disclosed confidences, how-
ever, because it ultimately determined that there was no substantial
relationship between the attorney's representation of Lemelson and the
challenged representation of Synergistics. 123
It is suggested that Judge Mansfield erred in applying and interpret-
ing the relevant precedent when he questioned the validity of applying
an irrebuttable presumption. The cases Judge Mansfield relied upon re-
ject only the irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences for decid-
ing motions for vicarious disqualification. 124 They do not recognize
114. 504 F. Supp. at 1167 (citing Government of India, 569 F.2d at 741 (Mans-
field, J., concurring)).
115. Id. at 1165.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1166.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing T.C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)).
120. Id. (citing Government of India v. Cook Indus., 422 F. Supp. 1057,
1059-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978)).
121. Id. at 1167. After examining the relevant law in the area of attorney
disqualification for a conflict of interest, the court stated that, "the better view
[is] that the court has latitude to permit the attorney to rebut [the] presump-
tion." Id. (citing Government of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 741 (2d
Cir. 1978) (Mansfield, J., concurring)).
122. See id. at 1167-69.
123. See id. The court found that the "information is not 'substantially' re-
lated to the issues in the present case." Id. at 1168.
124. For a brief discussion of the cases upon which Judge Mansfield relied,
see infra notes 166-75 and accompanying text (Laskey Bros.) and notes 178-79
(Silver Chrysler and Standard Oil).
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that the presumption of disclosed confidences is rebuttable.125 Thus re-
liance upon Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion should be avoided be-
cause the analysis is unsupportable. Consequently, as Lemelson relies
solely upon Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion, it is suggested that
any reliance upon Lemelson should be avoided as well. 126 Moreover, the
language in Lemelson supporting a rebuttable presumption of disclosed
confidences is dicta.
c. The Outlook for the Presumption of Disclosed Confidences
The decisions discussed in the previous sections indicate a tendency
on the part of some courts to resist disqualifying attorneys by applying
an irrebuttable presumption of disclosed confidences. As a lack of uni-
125. See Laskey Bros., 224 F.2d 824, 827; Standard Oil, 136 F. Supp. 345, 354.
In Laskey Bros., the court found the presumption of shared confidences to be re-
buttable where a former partner in a firm was challenged on the basis of repre-
sentations conducted by another attorney at his former firm. 224 F.2d at 827.
The court never addressed the issue of whether the presumption of disclosed
confidences is rebuttable. For a discussion of the presumption of shared confi-
dences, see supra notes 131-91 and accompanying text.
The Standard Oil court also recognized that the presumption of disclosed
confidences is irrebuttable where a substantial relationship exists between "the
subject matter of the [challenged representation] and the matters in which the
attorney represented his former client." 136 F. Supp. at 354. The court in Stan-
dard Oil ultimately denied the motion for disqualification not because the chal-
lenged attorney rebutted the presumption of disclosed confidences, but because
the movant failed to establish the existence of such a substantial relationship. Id.
at 357, 365; see also Annot., 56 A.L.R. FED. 189, § 5 (1980) (court will not inquire
whether confidential information was actually divulged prior to representation).
The Standard Oil court found that the work performed by the challenged attorney
during his former employment was unrelated to the instant controversy. 136 F.
Supp. at 365. The court concluded that "[any other ruling would delete all
meaning from the word 'substantial.'" Id. at 357 (footnote omitted). For a fur-
ther discussion of Standard Oil, see infra note 179.
In addition, the challenged attorney in Standard Oil was a former govern-
ment attorney-a factor which gives rise to a host of other exceptions to the
substantial relationship test that are not applicable in cases where an attorney
has switched from one firm to another. For a discussion of the exceptions to the
substantial relationship test raised by the situation of the former government
attorney, see infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
See also Novo, 607 F.2d at 192 (panel opinion). In Novo, Senior District
Judge Grant wrote: "We believe Judge Mansfield has taken language from
Chrysler and Laskey out of context." Id. (footnote omitted). Judge Grant added,
"We do not find that Laskey or United States v. Standard Oil detract from the prop-
osition that once a substantial relationship is found, it will be irrebuttably pre-
sumed that the attorney had access to confidential information." Id. (citations
omitted).
126. It should be recalled that the Lemelson court found that there was no
substantial relationship between the attorney's prior representation of Lemelson
and the challenged representation of Synergistics in its action against Lemelson.
See 504 F. Supp. at 1168. As there was no substantial relationship, there was no
need to apply the presumption of disclosed confidences. Thus, the discussion of
the presumption was unnecessary for the proper resolution of the motion before
the court.
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formity in dealing with motions for disqualification will lead only to un-
certainty, the courts should adopt one of two possible positions:
(1) they must abandon their occasional use of a rebuttable presumption
of disclosed confidences and adhere to the irrebuttable presumption as
the proper means of deciding all questions of disqualification where an
attorney undertakes to represent a party in an action against the attor-
ney's former client; or (2) they must abandon completely the irrebut-
table presumption of disclosed confidences and consistently apply the
rebuttable presumption.
It is suggested that the courts should abandon the rebuttable pre-
sumption of disclosed confidences and continue to adhere to the ir-
rebuttable presumption. This suggestion is supported by both the
majority of the reported decisions 12 7 and the policies underlying both
the Code and Model Rules. 128 While it is generally recognized that the
continued adherence to an irrebuttable presumption of disclosed confi-
dences often will work a hardship upon the challenged attorney and his
current client,' 2 9 a continued adherence to the irrebuttable presump-
tion is necessary to advance the important policies underlying Canon 4
and Model Rule 1.9. In addition, the hardship to both the current client
and the attorney will not be so great if the attorney is able to determine
in advance of litigation whether the courts will permit his representation
of the client, because the attorney can choose to forego any questiona-
ble representation. 130
127. For a partial list of cases supporting the application of an irrebuttable
presumption of disclosed confidences, see supra note 59.
128. For a discussion of the policies underlying the Code and Model Rules,
see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Comment, supra note *, at 175-76. The commentator argues
that an irrebuttable presumption of disclosed confidences "can result in an in-
fringement of the rights of the current client and the attorney." Id. at 175. The
author includes the following among the drawbacks of the continued application
of an irrebuttable presumption: loss to the client of an opportunity to be repre-
sented by the attorney of his choice; delay and added expense to the client in
finding a new attorney; and reputational damage and monetary loss to the dis-
qualified attorney. Id. According to the author, these drawbacks are especially
disconcerting where the attorney did not actually receive any confidential infor-
mation, because "he has not only done nothing unethical but could do nothing
unethical even if he wanted." Id. The author concludes: "Allowing the attorney
to show that no confidential information was received in the former representa-
tion would serve the public interest by allowing the attorney to foil some of the
disqualification motions made solely for tactical reasons." Id. at 176. See also
Note, supra note 46, at 928. The commentator explains the danger of the ir-
rebuttable presumption as follows:
A formulation of the attorney's ethical obligation which allows a former
client to disqualify an attorney who has never received any confidential
information useful in the present suit may unnecessarily restrict other
parties from access to the legal talent most familiar with the facts of
their case. Such a formulation may also unreasonably restrict access to
attorneys specializing in technical areas of law.
Id.
130. For a discussion of this concept, see supra notes 19-20.
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B. Vicarious Disqualification of Challenged Attorneys
Disqualification for a conflict of interest is not limited to direct dis-
qualification of the attorney who undertook the previous representation.
Other attorneys associated with that attorney potentially are subject to
vicarious disqualification, without regard to whether they actually partic-
ipated in the previous representation.' 3 '
As a general rule, where one attorney at a firm would be disqualified
from undertaking a challenged representation as a result of the pre-
sumption of disclosed confidences, the courts will apply a presumption
of shared confidences to vicariously disqualify other attorneys in the
firm. 13 2 As the presumption of disclosed confidences imputes to an at-
131. See, e.g., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980) (once a
substantial relationship is established, "the firm as a whole is disqualified
whether or not its other members were actually exposed to the information");
Kaufman, supra note *, at 662 ("Even if an attorney has not received any infor-
mation from a client and had no access to files dealing with the client's affairs, he
may nevertheless be disqualified if another member of the firm received confi-
dential information or had access to it."). See also Liebman, supra note *, at 1000
("principle that a lawyer can be disqualified from representing a client in a mat-
ter adverse to the interests of a present or former client of one of his present or
former partners or associates is known as 'vicarious disqualification' ") (footnote
omitted).
132. See, e.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266
(7th Cir. 1983) (adverse subsequent representation by a firm in substantially re-
lated matters must result in disqualification even if "different people in the firm
handled the two matters and scrupulously avoided discussing them"); Trone v.
Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Once the attorney is found to be
disqualified, both the attorney and the attorney's firm are disqualified from su-
ing the former client."); American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125,
1128 (5th Cir. 1971) (all members of firm barred from participating in case from
which one partner is disqualified) (citing Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
224 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956)); see also
United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900, 904 (5th Cir.) (criminal action) ("given
the presumed interplay among lawyers who practice together, [disqualification
applies to] the entire firm as well as all employees thereof"), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
843 (1979); Laskey Bros., 224 F.2d 824, 832 (Ryan, J., dissenting) ("Partners in a
law firm do not dwell in cubicles; they all must observe and respect the confi-
dence and trust a client has reposed in any one of them. ... ).
A conflict of interest can arise as a result of present or past representations
by partners, associates, and occasionally clerks or cocounsel. The conflict might
even arise from a former representation of an adverse party by a client of a chal-
lenged firm. See, e.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d
225, 235 (2d Cir. 1977) ("we have never believed that labels alone-partner,
clerk, co-counsel-should control our decisions"); NCK Org. v. Bregman, 542
F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1976) (counsel disqualified after consulting with disqualified
counsel); American Roller Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1975) (sum-
mer associate); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975) (attorney as
a client); American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir.
1971) (disqualification extends to employees of disqualified attorney); Laskey
Bros., 224 F.2d at 827 ("degree of association to effect disqualification need not
necessarily be that of a partner"); Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. at 360 (disquali-
fication extends to salaried law clerk). But cf American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed
Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971) (presumption not applicable to dis-
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torney confidences of his former client, the presumption of shared confi-
dences imputes to all attorneys in a firm the confidences possessed by
any individual attorney in the firm.' 3 3
The basis for the courts' presumption that members of a firm will
share the confidences of their clients rests in the courts' perception that
clients often select a law firm over an individual attorney because the
attorneys in a firm often call upon each other for expertise in particular
fields and for opinions concerning proposed courses of action.1 34 Addi-
tionally, clients' files are generally kept in places which are accessible by
all attorneys, 135 and some firms circulate memoranda throughout the
firm in order to generate ideas from the other attorneys in the firm.' 3 6
qualify cocounsel from one firm when relevant confidences are possessed by
cocounsel at another firm).
See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1979)
("If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employ-
ment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such employment.");
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983) ("Imputed Disquali-
fication: General Rule"). For a further discussion of the Code and Model Rules,
see infra notes 138-40 & 142 (Code) and notes 141-42, 153, 179 & 199 (Model
Rules) and accompanying text.
133. See Kaufman, supra note *, at 662. Judge Kaufman explains the pre-
sumption as follows:
This rule is based on a realistic recognition of the fact that lawyers will
generally discuss their cases with other lawyers in the firm. It recog-
nizes that the interests of protecting and maintaining the vital free flow
of information between attorney and client require that the knowledge
of one attorney in an office be imputed to all.
Id. For a partial list of cases applying the presumption of shared confidences,
see supra note 132. See also Comment, supra note 11, at 682 n.24.
134. See Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods., 605 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir. 1979).
In Dean Foods, the court explained:
Clients who retain, are billed by, and pay a law firm, can reasonably
expect, and often their problems require, that confidences disclosed to
one lawyer in the firm will- be shared with others in the firm. Indeed,
the ability to bring various fields of expertise to bear on a client's prob-
lem often serves as a justification for practice as a firm and the very
reason for the client's decision to retain the firm.
Id. See also Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 717 (7th
Cir. 1982) (finding "it was the practice of the firm to circulate and discuss among
the members of the law firm correspondence, opinions, memoranda, etc. gener-
ating from the firm's cases") (discussing the affidavit of Talivaldis Cepuritis,
counsel for Freeman); Comment, supra note 11, at 682 (the rule proceeds upon
the assumption that attorneys within a firm share confidences amongst each
other); Unchanging Rules, supra note *, at 1060 (rule accounts for difficulties of
"discovering and proving actual breaches of confidence within the close-knit and
often informal structure of a law-firm").
135. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715,
717 (7th Cir. 1982) (files were stored by firm in cabinets outside the challenged
attorney's office); Liebman, supra note *, at 997 (attorneys often have access to
confidential files "located in the firm or elsewhere").
136. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715,
717 (7th Cir. 1982) (it was the practice of the firm of the challenged attorney "to
circulate and discuss among the members of the law firm correspondence, opin-
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Vicarious disqualification is necessary to prevent the possibility that con-
fidential information might be used against the client by an attorney
with whom the client's former attorney shared the client's
confidences.
13 7
In the past, the courts have employed the presumption of shared
confidences to enforce the command of DR 5-105(D) of the Code. 138
This Disciplinary Rule directs: "If a lawyer is required to decline em-
ployment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule,
no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm, may accept or continue such employment."' 139 While the courts
generally agree that DR 5-105(D) controls questions of vicarious dis-
qualification for a conflict of interest, they have carved exceptions to the
rule in order to permit representations which technically should be pro-
hibited under the rule.' 40 The Model Rules, through rule 1.10, adopt
ions, memoranda, etc. generated from the firm's cases") (discussing affidavit of
Talivadis Capuritus, counsel for Freeman).
137. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods., 605 F.2d 380, 387 (8th Cir.
1979) (one member of a firm who actually possesses confidential information
might "inadvertently direct his staff to proceed along lines dictated or influ-
enced by that information") (footnote omitted); Liebman, supra note *, at 997
(because an attorney may not use a client's confidences to the disadvantage of
the client, "there is a serious conflict of interest when the lawyer's new position
requires that he file suit against one of his former clients") (footnote omitted);
Comment, supra note *, at 177-78 (vicarious disqualification prevents a lawyer
from "circumventing the confidentiality requirement simply by passing the [for-
mer client's] information on to an affiliated attorney") (footnote omitted). See
also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 5-11 legal background (Alter-
native Draft/Code of Professional Responsibility Format, May 30, 1981) ("The
basic purpose of the rule of imputed disqualification is to prohibit a lawyer from
circumventing professional standards through partners, associates and other
employees.").
138. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D)
(1983). See also Lacovara, Restricting the Private Law Practice of Former Government
Lawyers, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 379 (1978) (DR 5-105(D) functions to impute
disqualification to all attorneys in a firm whenever an individual attorney within
the firm is required to withdraw from employment under any disciplinary rule);
Sutton, supra note *, at 515-16 ("many courts have, in effect, converted DR 5-
105 into a procedural rule used to disqualify lawyers in 'conflict of interest' situ-
ations"); Comment, supra note 11, at 682 (DR 5-105(D) encompasses the tradi-
tional rule that the disqualification of an individual lawyer will disqualify all
lawyers affiliated with him).
139. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR5-105(D) (1983).
140. See, e.g., Schiessle, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983) (representation permit-
ted where an entire firm would otherwise be disqualified under DR5-105 be-
cause the attorney in the firm, who was in a position to receive confidences of
the opposing party while he was with another firm was not involved in the chal-
lenged representation and had been effectively screened from other attorneys in
the firm who were involved in the challenged action); LaSalle, 703 F.2d 252 (7th
Cir. 1983) (same; attorney who subjected firm to potential disqualification was a
former government attorney); Novo, 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (at-
torneys at a firm who would otherwise be precluded from undertaking a chal-
lenged representation, permitted to do so when the attorney who subjected
them to potential disqualification under DR5-105 was no longer with the firm);
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the judicially created exceptions to DR 5-105(D) and provide detailed
guidelines for determining when members of a firm can represent a cli-
ent whose interests are adverse to those of a client of another present or
former member of the firm. 14 1
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir.
1975) (permitting representation which technically violated DR5-105 where at-
torney who subjected firm to potential disqualification was only "peripherally"
involved in prior representation); Laskey Bros., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955) (attorney who would otherwise be precluded
from undertaking a challenged representation by virtue of his partnership with
attorney who previously represented the adverse party, permitted to represent
party whose interests were adverse to former client of attorney's partner where
partnership was dissolved and the party came to the attorney through channels
independent of the former partnership); cf Freeman, 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.
1982) (permitting a challenged firm to rebut the presumption that a new attor-
ney in the firm obtained confidences of an adverse party while at his former
firm). In Silver Chrysler, the district court noted:
[A]n irrebuttable broad presumption would forever bar any participa-
tion in any suits against any interests ever represented by a previous
firm by all partners and associates of a large firm-even students work-
ing for one summer. The size and influence of modern law firms and
the numbers of huge national and international corporate interests they
represent militate against such a harsh result.
Silver Chrysler, 370 F. Supp. 581, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), afd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir.
1975). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 5-11 legal back-
ground (Alternative Draft/Code of Professional Responsibility Format, May 30,
1981). The drafters of the Model Rules explain that many cases have
fashioned a rebuttable presumption that a lawyer formerly associated
with a firm had received confidential information transmitted by a client
to another lawyer in the firm. A similar approach was taken with re-
spect to the lawyer's former associates, who were presumed to have
received confidential information from the lawyer during their associa-
tion. The per se rule applied to ongoing associations has been rejected
in situations of former association because it would unnecessarily re-
strict individual access to "technically trained attorneys in specialized
areas," and would seriously jeopardize the career development and
mobility of lawyers associated with large law firms.
Id. (citations omitted).
141. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983). The
rule provides:
Rule 1.10 Imputed Disqualification: General Rule
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone
would be prohibited form doing so by rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may
not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was associ-
ated, had previously represented a client whose interests are materially
adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired infor-
mation protected by rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the
firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with inter-
ests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly
associated lawyer unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in
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The following sections of this note examine the various situations
underlying motions for vicarious disqualification. The situations are dis-
tinguished as they are in the Model Rules to demonstrate the differences
in how the courts should approach the varying situations.
1. Situations Involving Two Attorneys in the Same Firm at the Time of Both
the Previous Representation and the Adverse Subsequent Representation
The most basic situation in which vicarious disqualification is appro-
priate is when attorney A, who represented the former client, and attor-
ney B, who undertakes to represent a client whose interests are adverse
to the interests of A's former client, are both members of the same firm
at the times of both the previous representation of the former client by
A and the challenged adverse subsequent representation by B. Both the
Code and Model Rules prohibit attorney B from undertaking the ad-
verse subsequent representation under such circumstances. 14 2 In such a
situation, the court should vicariously disqualify attorney B by applying
an irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences.14
3
The basic situation discussed above was the background for
Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc. 144 In that case, an attorney, Fine, had
performed services for NPD in connection with a deal to transfer stock
to NPD's executive vice president and manager. 1 45 A few years later,
which the formerly associated lawyer represented the cli-
ent; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information pro-
tected by rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the
matter.
Id.
142. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C)
(1979); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(a) (1983).
143. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221
(7th Cir. 1978). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 5-11 legal
background (Alternative Draft/Code of Professional Responsibility Format, May
30, 1981) ("while lawyers continue in an association with one another, courts
apply a per se rule and prohibit representation by any member of the firm where
a single lawyer could not represent both clients"); Comment, supra note *, at
178 (generally courts will presume irrebuttably that attorneys affiliated within a
law firm share with each other the confidential information of their clients). Cf
W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Hook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1961) (new
partner in firm prohibited, "ipso facto," from undertaking representation of cli-
ent whose interests were adverse to those of a former client of another present
partner in the firm), afd 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962) (per curiam). In Westing-
house, the court disqualified Westinghouse's codefendant's counsel (the Bigbee
firm) because members of the firm had previously represented the plaintiff, Gulf
Oil, in substantially related matters. Id. at 223. While the court did not state
whether any of the attorneys undertaking the challenged representation and the
attorneys who previously represented Gulf Oil had been members of the firm
throughout both representations, the court did note that nine of the Bigbee
firm's twelve attorneys participated in the Gulf Oil representation-including
one of the firm's name partners. Id.
144. 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
145. Id. at 1265. NPD had employed Fine in 1975 to structure a bonus
500 [Vol. 30: p. 463
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss2/4
NPD's vice president resigned from the corporation and formed
Analytica.1 46 NPD's former vice president subsequently retained Fine's
firm to represent Analytica in an antitrust action against NPD.1
4 7
In reviewing the district court's disqualification of Analytica's coun-
sel, the Seventh Circuit applied an irrebuttable presumption of shared
confidences to affirm the district court's order:
[A] lawyer may not represent an adversary of his former client
if the subject matter of the two representations is "substantially
related," which means: if a lawyer could have obtained confi-
dential information in the first representation that would have
been relevant in the second. It is irrelevant . . . whether-if
the lawyer is a firm rather than an individual practioner-differ-
ent people in the firm handled the two matters and scrupu-
lously avoided discussing them. 14
8
At least one court has gone so far as to declare that attorneys in a
firm are prohibited from undertaking a representation of a client whose
interests are adverse to those of a former client of any other present
attorney in the firm, without regard to whether the attorney undertaking
the challenged representation was with the firm at the time of the previ-
ous representation. In WE. Bassett v. H.C. Cook Co., 4 9 the district court
held that a member of a firm will be disqualified "ipso facto" from un-
dertaking a representation of a client whose interests are adverse to
those of a client of another "present partner" of the firm. 150
stock transaction for the benefit of NPD's executive vice-president, Malec. Id. In
order for Fine to value the stock to be transferred, it was necessary for NPD to
disclose to Fine information about its "financial condition, sales trends, and
management." Id.
146. Id. Malec left NPD in 1977, two years after Fine had been employed by
NPD to structure the stock transfer. Id. Malec and his wife, who also had been
employed by NPD, subsequently formed Analytica to compete with NPD in the
market research business. Id.
147. Id. NPD retained the firm of Schwartz & Freeman to file a complaint
with the FTC, against NPD charging that NPD was engaged in "anticompetitive
behavior that was preventing Analytica from establishing itself in the market."
Id.
148. Id. at 1266 (citing Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
646 F.2d 1020, 1028 (5th Cir. 1981); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th
Cir. 1980); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 223-25
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 646 F.2d
706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976); Canon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 532 F.2d
1118, 1119 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528
F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976); Emle Indus. v. Patentex, 478 F.2d 562, 570-71
(2d Cir. 1973)).
149. 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1962), af'd, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962)
(per curiam).
150. Id. at 824-25. The motion to disqualify counsel arose in Bassett after
Bassett's attorney, Cunningham, became a partner in a firm which previously
represented Cook in earlier litigation between Bassett and Cook. Id. at 821-23.
The prior representation of Cook was undertaken by Dunham, a name partner
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2. Situations Where an Attorney Has Terminated His Association with a Firm
and the Firm Subsequently Undertakes to Represent a Client in an
Action Against a Client Who the Attorney Represented While He
was Still with the Firm
Only one court has had the opportunity to decide a motion to dis-
qualify counsel in this setting. In Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter
Travenol Laboratories,15 1 the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc held that the
presumption of shared confidences is rebuttable where the member of
the firm who undertook the previous representation is no longer with
the firm. 15 2 The Model Rules support this position as well.
153
In Novo, an attorney left his firm and took with him one of the firm's
clients, Baxter Travenol. 154 Novo Terapeutisk subsequently retained
the attorney's former firm to represent it in an action against Baxter
Travenol.155 After the attorney's former firm filed a motion to appear as
counsel for Novo Terapeutisk, Baxter Travenol filed motions to disqual-
ify its attorney's former firm.156
After the district court denied Baxter Traveniol's motion, the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed the district court and disqualified the firm.15 7 The
court of appeals recognized that "[t]he question of whether [the] pre-
sumption [of shared confidences] is rebuttable was never clearly an-
in the firm. Id. at 822. The court disqualified the entire firm from representing
Bassett even though Dunham advised Cook of the representation by Cunning-
ham, returned all files pertaining to the firm's representation of Cook, and iso-
lated Cunningham from the other members of the firm. Id. at 822-23. In
addition, while the Cook Company did not expressly consent to Cunningham's
representation of Bassett, the company withheld its objection to the representa-
tion for more than three years after Dunham informed the company of the rep-
resentation. Id. at 823. For a further discussion of Bassett, see Unchanging Rules,
supra note *, at 1061-62.
151. 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc). For a further discussion of
Novo, see supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
152. Id. at 197.
153. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(c) (1983). Rule
1.10(c) provides:
When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is
not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests ma-
terially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associ-
ated lawyer unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which
the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by
rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
Id.
154. 607 F.2d at 194. The attorney, Cook, was formerly a member of the
Chicago firm which represented Baxter Travenol. Id. Cook was the attorney in
charge of the Baxter Travenol account and when he left the firm, he took the
account with him. Id.
155. Id. at 195.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 193 (panel opinion).
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swered by this court." 15 8  The court avoided settling the question,
however, by resting its decision on Canon 9's broad prohibition against
undertaking a representation which creates the appearance of impropri-
ety. 15 9 Under Canon 9, the court stated, "actual receipt of confidential
information by other members of the [attorney's former] firm is irrele-
vant." 160  In a dissent, Chief Judge Fairchild argued that the court
should have affirmed the district court's denial of disqualification be-
cause Novo Terapeutisk's attorneys rebutted the presumption of shared
confidences.' 6 1 On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit held that the
presumption of shared confidences is rebuttable under certain circum-
stances,1 6 2 and that the firm undertaking the representation of Novo
158. Id. at 192 (panel opinion). The court explained that the question of
whether the presumption of shared confidences was rebuttable had arisen in a
previous case, but that the court avoided the issue by affirming the district
court's grant of disqualification by applying Canon 9's prohibition against un-
dertaking a representation which raises the appearance of impropriety. Id. (cit-
ing Schloetter v. Railoc. Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710-11 (7th Cir. 1976)). See also
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1979).
Three years before the Seventh Circuit decided Novo, the court was faced
with an analogous appeal in Schloetter. See 546 F.2d 706. In Schloetter, however,
the situation was more complicated because there was a factual dispute over
whether the attorney who had previously represented the movant had actually
left the firm. Id. at 710-11. Without deciding the factual issue, the court re-
served decision on whether the presumption of shared confidences is rebuttable.
Id. at 711. Instead, the court held that it was not crucial to the case to determine
whether the presumption is rebuttable because the firm of the departed attorney
failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut such a presumption. Id. The court
ultimately rested its decision on the ground that the challenged firm must be
disqualified upon the basis of Canon 9's prohibition against undertaking a repre-
sentation which creates the appearance of impropriety. Id. at 712.
159. 607 F.2d at 192.
160. Id. The court added, however:
[W]e wish to retreat slightly from the appearance that we have en-
couraged inflexible irrebuttable presumptions that could possibly lead
to unreasonable results under unforseen circumstances. These pre-
sumptions are designed to promote the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, yet all courts should keep in mind a reasonable balance between
a client's right to his own freely chosen counsel and the need to main-
tain the highest ethical standards. In the case at bar, we believe that the
proper balance has been maintained by our decision.
Id. at 193 (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 194 (Fairchild, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Fairchild argued
that the facts surrounding the motion to disqualify Novo Terapeutisk's counsel
called for the court to apply a rebuttable presumption of shared confidences. Id.
He stated: "Here, where the party seeking disqualification is in a position to
know exactly what confidences were shared and what conflicts there may be and
yet fails to allege, even in general terms, that any were shared or exist, it is
appropriate to consider the presumption a rebuttable one." Id. Applying his
interpretation of the presumption to the facts of the case, the Chief Judge con-
cluded: "On the record before us [the presumption of shared confidences] has
clearly been rebutted. I would not deny Novo the counsel of its choice and
would affirm the decision of the district court." Id.
162. Id. at 197 (en banc). The court split five to three. Writing for the
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Terapeutisk had "clearly and effectively rebutted" the presumption.' 63
3. Situations Where an Attorney Leaves a Firm and Joins Another Firm Which
Represents an Adversary to a Client of the Attorney's Former Firm
a. Applying the Presumption of Shared Confidences to the Attorney
Who Switched Firms
Where an attorney who switched firms participated in the represen-
tation of a client, who is now the adverse party in litigation involving a
current client of the attorney's new firm, the courts employ the irrebut-
table presumption of disclosed confidences to disqualify the attorney
who switched firms from participating in the litigation against his former
client.' 64 There is authority for employing a rebuttable presumption of
shared confidences, however, where the attorney who switched firms did
not participate in the representation of the adverse party at his former
firm. 1
6 5
majority, ChiefJudge Fairchild, the author of the dissent in the panel decision,
explained:
The circumstances of this case demonstrate that the presumption that
Cook shared confidences with his associates at the Hume firm need not
be irrebuttable. . . . Although the client, Baxter, would be entitled to
the benefit of the presumption that Cook [shared the client's confi-
dences with other members of the Hume firm], and to the resolution of
any doubts in Baxter's favor, we do not find it necessary to exclude
from consideration evidence clearly showing otherwise.
Id. at 197 (citations omitted).
163. Id. The court based its conclusion on the fact that Baxter's own attor-
ney was in the best position to know exactly what confidences of Baxter's he
might have shared with the members of his former firm, but that the attorney
failed to allege, "even in general terms, that he shared confidences received in
connection with [a substantially related] matter . . . ." Id. While the court
found the presumption of shared confidences was rebutted in the present action,
the court declined to decide what quality or quantity of proof is required in gen-
eral to rebut the presumption. See id
164. For a discussion of the presumption of disclosed confidences, see supra
notes 54-130 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983) (after
a substantial relationship is established, the court "must next ascertain whether
the presumption of shared confidences with respect to the prior representation
has been rebutted") (footnote omitted); Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler
Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975) ("while . . . an inference may
arise that an attorney formerly associated with a firm himself received confiden-
tial information transmitted by a client to the firm, that inference is a rebuttable
one") (citing Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
136 F. Supp. 345, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT DR 5-11 legal background (Alternative Draft/Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility Format, May 30, 1981) ("where a lawyer can show that during the
prior association he did not receive confidential information relating to the for-
mer client, neither the lawyer nor the second firm in which he is associated is
disqualified from undertaking representation adverse to the first firm's client in
the same or a substantially related matter") (citing Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co.,
534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Silver Chrysler Plym-
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The notion that the presumption of shared confidences is rebutta-
ble by an attorney after he leaves the firm at which other attorneys are
presumed to have shared relevant client confidences with him was first
established in Laskey Brothers, Inc. v. Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc. 166 In
Laskey, an attorney, Malkan, had formerly been a partner with another
attorney, Isacson, who had obtained confidential information about
Warner Brothers while employed by his former law firm. 16 7 Laskey
Brothers initially retained the firm of Malkan & Isacson to represent it in
an antitrust action against Warner Brothers.' 68 After the Malkan & Isac-
son partnership was dissolved, Laskey Brothers retained Malkan and his
new partner, Ellner, to continue the representation.' 6 9 Austin Theatre
also retained the new firm, Malkan & Ellner, to represent them in an
action against Warner Brothers.' 70 Warner Brothers subsequently
sought to disqualify Malkan & Ellner from representing Laskey Brothers
or Austin Theatre because of Malkan's former partnership with Isac-
son. 1 7 1 The district court disqualified Malkan & Ellner from represent-
ing Laskey Brothers because the case had originally come to the firm of
Malkan & Isacson. 17 2 The court did not disqualify Malkan & Ellner from
outh v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); Laskey Bros., Inc. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955)).
It should be noted that if the attorney who switched firms successfully re-
buts the presumption of shared confidences with regard to his former firm, then
there is no need for the court to examine whether the attorneys at his new firm
should be disqualified, because the attorney who switched firms could not share
information with them which he does not possess. See Arkansas y. Dean Food
Prods., 605 F.2d 380, 387 (8th Cir. 1979) (the challenged firm can not be dis-
qualified when the challenged attorney is exonerated because the attorney
"[can] not impart knowledge he did not have"); Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co.,
534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976) (disqualification of other members of a
challenged attorney's firm "vanishes with [the challenged attorney's]
nondisqualification").
166. 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955). For other discussions of Laskey, see Lieb-
man, supra note *, at 1005-07; Note, supra note 10, at 997-98; Note, New Direc-
tions, supra note *, at 135-36.
167. 224 F.2d at 825. The court noted that, in independent proceedings,
Isacson "has been found to have obtained confidential information about the
defendants in the course of his former employment ...... Id.
168. Id. at 826.
169. Id. After Laskey Brothers retained Malkan & Ellner who brought suit
in the western district of Pennslyvania, the new counsel instituted a new suit in
the southern district of New York. Id. The two suits did not differ in any mate-
rial respect. Id.
170. Id. at 825. The court noted that the Austin retainer "had come to
[Malkan & Ellner] by channels completely apart from Malkan's former associa-
tion with Isacson." Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
qualification of Malkan & Ellner, stating, "Once a partner is thus vicariously
disqualified for a particular case, the subsequent dissolution of the partnership
cannot cure his ineligibility to act as counsel in that case." Id. at 826-27. Under
the court's analysis, because Malkan would have been disqualified from repre-
senting Laskey Brothers when the case initially came to the firm of Malkan &
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representing Austin Theatre, however, because Malkan had rebutted the
presumption that Isacson shared Warner Brothers' confidences with
him. 173
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court was cor-
rect in permitting Malkan to rebut the presumption that Isacson shared
with him the Warner Brothers confidences which Isacson possessed.' 74
The court stated, "Once the partnership is dissolved ... the inference
from access to receipt of information, in a new case having no relation-
ship to the old partnership . . . should . . . become rebuttable legally,
lest the chain of disqualification become endless."' 7 5
In the more recent decision of Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument
Co.,176 the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for a determination of
whether an attorney who switched firms had rebutted the presumption
that he shared in the secrets and confidences of a client of his former
firm. 177
In addition to allowing rebuttal of the presumption of shared confi-
dences, some courts have developed and employed a "peripheral repre-
Isacson, Malkan was forever barred from representing Laskey Brothers in litiga-
tion against Warner Brothers. Id.
173. Id. at 827. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
Malkan had testified at a hearing before the trial court that he had not received
any confidences from Isacson. The court also noted that the trial judge "obvi-
ously believed him." Id.
174. Id. Though Warner Brothers introduced evidence to prove that Mal-
kan had knowledge of confidential information, the court found the evidence
insufficient to "overcome the favorable effect of Malkan's testimony and de-
meanor as appraised by the trial judge." Id.
175. Id. Accord American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129
(5th Cir. 1971) (the presumption of shared confidences must become rebuttable
when an attorney leaves a firm where he would have been vicariously disquali-
fied, otherwise "imputation and consequent disqualification could continue ad
infinitum").
See also Harmar Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros., Inc., 239 F.2d 555
(2d Cir. 1957). In Harmar, Warner Brothers again moved to disqualify Malkan &
Ellner from representing a plaintiff against it in an antitrust action. Id. at 556.
The court reaffirmed its decision in Laskey, holding that in subsequent actions,
other than those from which Malkan had already been vicariously disqualified by
virtue of his prior association with Isacson, there was a rebuttable presumption
that Isacson shared Warner Brothers' confidences with Malkan. Id. at 556-57.
The court did not address the question of whether Ellner could rebut the pre-
sumption of shared confidences if Malkan was disqualified, because the partner-
ship of Malkan & Ellner had been dissolved and the question was moot. Id. at
557. It is suggested that in light of Schiessle and LaSalLe, the latter presumption
would be rebuttable if the same case were to arise today. For a discussion of
Schiessle and LaSalle which supports this suggestion, see infra notes 185-91 and
accompanying text.
176. 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of Freeman, see supra
notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
177. See id. at 723. The court stated, "[I]f an attorney can clearly and effec-
tively show that he had no knowledge of the confidences and secrets of the cli-
ent, disqualification is unnecessary and a court order of such might reasonably
be regarded as an abuse of discretion."
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sentation" exception to avoid disqualifying an attorney who switches
firms and subsequently becomes involved in litigation against a client of
his former firm. 17 8 Under the exception, a challenged attorney can
avoid disqualification by proving that he did not perform any services at
his former firm which could be considered to be a representation of the
party seeking disqualification.
179
b. Applying the Presumption of Shared Confidences to the Attorneys
in the New Firm of the Attorney Who Switched Firms
If the attorney who switched firms is unable to rebut the presump-
tion that attorneys at his former firm shared relevant client confidences
with him, or if he has been disqualified as a result of the court's applica-
tion of an irrebuttable presumption of disclosed confidences, then the
courts will apply a presumption of shared confidences to impute to the
attorneys in his new firm any confidences that he is presumed to
possess. 180
178. See Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 861 (1976); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
179. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d
751 (2d Cir. 1975). In Silver Chrysler, the court reasoned as follows:
there is reason to differentiate for disqualification purposes between
lawyers who become heavily involved in the facts of a particular matter
and those who enter briefly on the periphery for a limited and specified
purpose relating solely to legal questions. In large firms at least, the
former are normally the more seasoned lawyers and the latter the more
junior. . . . Under the latter circumstances the attorney's role cannot
be considered "representation" within the meaning of T.C. Theatre Corp.
and Emie so as to require disqualification. . . .To apply the remedy
when there is no realistic chance that confidences were disclosed would
go far beyond the purpose of those decisions.
Id. at 756-57. In the alternative, the court recognized that, even if the presump-
tion of shared confidences were to apply in his situation, the challenged attorney
had rebutted the presumption that he had obtained confidences from his former
firm. Id. at 757.
See also Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 861 (1976). In Gas-A-Tron, the court relied upon Silver Chrysler to re-
verse the district court's grant of a motion to disqualify an attorney by virtue of
his former association with a law firm which represented the opposing party.
The court stated, "Here, as in [Silver Chysler], the associate had not actually ob-
tained any confidential information . . . that would be relevant to the pending
litigation, and had not worked on matters that were 'substantially related' to the
pending litigation." Id. at 1325 (footnote omitted).
180. See, e.g., Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421; LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 257. It is sug-
gested that the court's analysis of whether the members of the new firm should
be disqualified by virtue of the presumption of shared confidences should vary
according to the reason for the disqualification of the attorney who switched
firms.
If the attorney who switched firms did not represent the adverse party while
he was at his former firm, and he is disqualified as a result of his inability to
rebut the presumption of shared confidences, then it is suggested that the
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While the Model Rules prohibit all attorneys in a firm from under-
taking a representation where the new attorney in the firm actually pos-
sessed confidences of an adverse party,"'8 LaSalle National Bank v. County
of Lake' 82 and Schiessle v. Stephens' 8 3 support giving the attorneys at the
disqualified attorney's new firm an opportunity to rebut the presump-
tion that the new attorney shared the confidences which he possessed
with the attorneys in the new firm.' 8 4
In both LaSalle and Schiessle, the Seventh Circuit was faced with situ-
ations where the attorney who switched firms actually had participated
in the representation of the adverse party while he still was with his for-
mer firm. 18 5 Neither attorney, however, was involved in the challenged
representation. 18 6 In both cases, after establishing that a substantial re-
court's analysis of whether the attorney's new firm should be disqualified should
take into account only whether the new firm has rebutted the presumption that
the attorney has shared the confidences with his new firm. This suggestion is
based upon the proposition that it would be a waste of judicial resources to
make two separate inquiries as to the extent of the attorney's possession of con-
fidences when the initial inquiry which resulted in the attorney's disqualification
is sufficient.
If, however, the attorney who switched firms did represent the adverse party
while at his former firm, and was disqualified as a result of the court's applica-
tion of an irrebuttable presumption of disclosed confidences, then the court
should undertake a more thorough analysis when determining whether the at-
torney's new firm should be disqualified. Under this more thorough analysis, if
the court concludes that the attorney who switched firms does not actually pos-
sess relevant confidences of his former client, but was only presumed to possess
such confidences, then the court should permit his new firm to continue the
challenged representation. If the court concludes that the disqualified attorney
actually did possess relevant confidences of the adverse party, then the court
should inquire further to determine whether the attorneys at his new firm have
rebutted the presumption that he shared those confidences with them. See
Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421; LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 257.
181. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983). For
the text of rule 1.10, see supra note 141.
182. 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983).
183. 711 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983).
184. See Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421; LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 257.
185. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 419-21; LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 253-54. In Schiessle,
the court quoted from the affidavits of both King, the attorney who switched
firms, and one of his former partners. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 419, 420-21. King's
own affidavit stated that he had performed some work on behalf of the movant
prior to switching firms. Id. at 419. In addition, King's former partner averred
that (1) "King was the ... 'partner in charge' of representing the [movants]";
(2) King had conversations with the movants concerning the lawsuit on four sep-
arate occasions; and (3) King had "numerous conferences" with the movants
and other attorneys. Id. at 419-21 (quoting the affidavit of William Goldberg,
former partner to King).
In LaSalle, the court explained that Seidler, the attorney who switched firms,
had "general supervisory responsibility with respect to all civil cases handled by
the State's Attorney's office," and that Seidler had reviewed the relevant docu-
ments prepared for writing the agreement which was the subject of the chal-
lenged representation. LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 253-54.
186. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 419; LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 255. In Schiessle, the
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lationship existed between the previous representation of the movant
and the current representation, 8 7 the court employed a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the attorney who had switched firms possessed confi-
dences of his former firm's client.' 8 8 Upon determining that the
attorney who switched firms had not rebutted the presumption that he
possessed relevant confidences of his former firm's client,' 8 9 each court
went on to determine whether the attorney's new firm had rebutted the
presumption that the attorney who switched firms had shared with the
attorneys in his new firm the confidence which he was presumed to pos-
sess. 190 Both the LaSalle and the Schiessle courts concluded that the at-
torney's new firm failed to rebut the presumption of shared
court noted that King had averred in an affidavit, "Since the time I joined [the
challenged firm] I have . . . not worked on the Schiessle case ...... Schiessle,
717 F.2d at 419. This claim was never contested. Similarly, the LaSalle court
noted that "Seidler has submitted a sworn affidavit stating that he has not dis-
closed to his law firm or any of its personnel any information about [his previous
representation of the opposing party] relevant to the present litigation," and
that "Seidler has been screened from all involvement in the litigation since the
motion to disqualify was filed." LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 255. While the LaSalle court
never expressly stated that Seidler was not involved in the challenged represen-
tation, such a conclusion can be inferred from the fact that Seidler never dis-
closed to other attorneys in the firm any information concerning his previous
representation. Assuming that Seidler's averrment was truthful, it is difficult to
imagine that Seidler could have participated in the representation without dis-
closing such information to his co-workers at the firm.
187. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 420 ("there is no dispute that the subject matter
of the prior and present representations are substantially related-indeed the
subject matter is identical"); LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 257 ("the subjects of [the] past
and present representation were substantially related").
188. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 420; LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 256. The Schiessle court
analyzed the issue as follows:
We must determine whether the attorney whose change of employment
created the disqualification issue was actually privy to any confidential
information his prior law firm received from the party now seeking dis-
qualification of his present firm. The evidence presented to rebut this
presumption must "clearly and effectively" demonstrate that the attor-
ney in question had no knowledge of the information, confidences
and/or secrets related by the client in the prior representation.
Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 420 (citing Freeman, 689 F.2d at 723).
The LaSalle court applied a similar analysis: "If, after evaluating the facts
. . . we find that such a substantial relationship did exist, we are entitled to pre-
sume that the attorney received confidential information during his prior repre-
sentation. This presumption, however, is a rebuttable one." LaSalle, 703 F.2d at
256 (citing Freeman, 689 F.2d at 722; Novo, 607 F.2d at 1197; Schloetter v.
Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976)).
189. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421; LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 257.
190. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421; LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 257. The Schiessle court
stated that the proper question became "whether the knowledge of the 'confi-
dences and secrets' of the [movants] which [the disqualified attorney] brought
with him has been passed on to or is likely to be passed on to the members of
[the disqualified attorney's] firm." Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421. The LaSalle court
reasoned similarly: "Having found that [the attorney who switched firms] was
properly disqualified . . . we must now address whether this disqualification
should be extended to [his] entire law firm .... " LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 257.
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confidences. 1 9
c. Screening
In determining whether the attorneys in the new firm of the attor-
ney who switched firms had rebutted the presumption of shared confi-
dences, both the Schiessle and the LaSalle courts examined the record for
evidence of "institutional mechanisms" which would have insulated the
191. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421; LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 259. Both courts fo-
cussed on the fact that the firms had not employed adequate "institutional
mechanisms" to screen the disqualified attorney from infecting the firm.
Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421; LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 259. For a further discussion of
"screening", see infra notes 192-216 and accompanying text,
See also Canadian Gulf Lines v. Triton Int'l Carriers, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 691
(D. Conn. 1976). Canadian Gulf Lines involved a situation similar to those of
LaSalle and Schiessle in that an attorney who previously had represented one party
terminated his relationship with the party and the attorney's new partner subse-
quently undertook to represent another party in an action against his partner's
former client. See id. at 692. In deciding the former client's motion to disqualify
his former attorney's new partner, the court found a substantial relationship ex-
isted between the matters involved in the client's previous representation by his
attorney and the current representation. Id. at 694-95. The court held, how-
ever, that the client's former attorney "rebutted the inference that he 'received'
confidential information in the sense of having cognitively processed and re-
tained [substantially related] information ....... Id. at 694-95. In reaching its
conclusion, the Canadian Gulf Lines court relied upon Laskey and Silver Chrysler.
Id. at 694 (citing Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v, Chrysler Motor Corp., 518
F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1975); Laskey Bros., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224
F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956)). It is suggested that
the Canadian Gulf Lines court misinterpreted the cases upon which it relied in
reaching its decision. The cited cases involved situations where the representa-
tion was permitted after the challenged attorneys proved to the courts that attor-
neys in their former firms had never shared relevant confidential information with
them. See Silver Chrysler, 518 F.2d at 756; Laskey, 224 F.2d at 827. In Canadian
Gulf Lines, however, the challenged attorney was a current partner to the attor-
ney who previously represented the opposing party, and the court undertook to
determine whether the challenged attorney's partner actually had obtained con-
fidences directly from his former client. Id. at 694. For a discussion of the hold-
ings of Laskey and Silver Chrylser, see supra notes 166-75 (Laskey) & notes 178-79
(Silver Chrysler) and accompanying text.
Although Canadian Gulf Lines misapplied the decisions upon which it relied,
the result which the court reached in that case is consistent with the subsequent
decisions of the Seventh Circuit in Schiessle and LaSalle because the attorney who
formerly represented the opposing party in Canadian Gulf Lines was not involved
in the challenged representation. See 434 F. Supp. at 692. While the result
reached in Canadian Gulf Lines is consistent with Schiessle and LaSalle, the rationale
of Canadian Gulf Lines is not consistent with the subsequent decisions. No court,
aside from the Canadian Gulf Lines court, has recognized that the presumption of
disclosed confidences does not apply where an attorney actually represented a
client, but where information disclosed by the client was not "cognitively
processed and retained" by the attorney. It is suggested that this rationale is
erroneous and should not be followed by courts in the future.
It should be noted that the Canadian Gulf Lines court ultimately disqualified
the challenged attorney by invoking the admonition against the appearance of
impropriety found in Canon 9. Id. at 695.
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attorney who switched firms from sharing confidences with other attor-
neys in the new firm.' 92 Both courts ultimately determined that the in-
stitutional mechanisms which the firm had employed were insufficient to
insulate the firm from obtaining the confidences possessed by the attor-
ney who joined the firm. 193
In its discussion of whether the institutional mechanisms employed
by Siedler's firm were sufficient to insulate the firm from disqualifica-
tion, the LaSalle court reviewed the decisions of various courts which
have approved the use of screening.' 94 The LaSalle court found that
192. See Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421; LaSalle 703 F.2d at 257. The LaSalle
court isolated the issue as follows:
The question arises here whether th[e] presumption [that the attorney
who switched firms has shared confidences in his possession with other
members of his new firm] may be effectively rebutted by establishing
that the "infected" attorney was "screened," or insulated, from all par-
ticipation in and information about a case, thus avoiding disqualifica-
tion of an entire law firm based on the prior employment of one
member.
708 F.2d at 257. The court failed to state whether proof of screening, absent
any other evidence to rebut the presumption of shared confidences, would be
sufficient rebuttal, as the court found that the new firm of the attorney who
switched firms had not employed adequate screening. See id. The court did
state, however, that "timely screening arrangements are essential to the avoid-
ance of firm disqualification." Id. at 259 n.3 (emphasis supplied by court).
The court's holding only expressly states that adequate screening is a neces-
sary condition to rebutting the presumption of shared confidences. Id. It is sug-
gested that the court's opinion implicitly recognizes that proof of screening is a
sufficient condition as well. The cases and commentaries which the court dis-
cussed in its examination of the issue all support such a proposition. See
Grietzer & Locks v. Johns-Mansville Corp., No. 81-1379 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1982)
(disqualification of firm unnecessary where adequate screening was undertaken
by firm); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (screen-
ing sufficient to remove potential "taint to trial process") (dicta), vacated on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. CI.
1977) (per curiam) (entire firm need not be disqualified where screening proce-
dures insure separation of attorney in possession of relevant confidences from
rest of firm). See also LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 258 (citing Liebman, supra note *; Com-
ment, supra note 8; Comment, The Future of the Chinese Wall Defense to Vicarious
Disqualification of a Former Government Attorney's Law Firm, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
151 (1981); Note, supra note *. It is suggested that if the LaSalle court disagreed
with the views supported by the cases and commentaries which it discussed, the
court would have so noted its disagreement in its discussion. For a further dis-
cussion of the LaSalle court's analysis of the issue, see infra notes 194-99 and
accompanying text.
193. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421; LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 259. The Schiessle court
found that there was no evidence whatsoever tending to establish that the attor-
ney's new firm attempted to screen the attorney from the other members of the
firm. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421. The LaSalle court held that the screening em-
ployed was insufficient because the firm did not establish the screening until
after the County of Lake filed the disqualification motion. LaSalle, 703 F.2d at
259.
194. 703 F.2d at 257-59. The LaSalle court briefly examined cases from the
Fourth and Second Circuits and from the Court of Claims. Id. at 258-59 (citing
Grietzer & Locks v. Johns-Mansville Corp., No. 81-1379 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1982);
49
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other courts only have approved of screening to rebut the presumption
of shared confidences where the screening included the following:
1. procedures whereby the infected attorney is prevented
from discussing the case or obtaining information from or
relating information to attorneys in the firm who are in-
volved in the challenged representation; 195
2. procedures whereby the infected attorney is denied any fi-
nancial benefit from the challenged representation; 19 6 and
3. procedures ensuring that the screen is activated before the
challenged representation is commenced. 19 7
While the LaSalle court did not state it to be a requirement, it is
significant that in LaSalle and in every case which the court discussed,
the attorney who was screened from the rest of the firm was a former
government attorney. 198 In addition, the Model Rules advocate screen-
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl.
1977) (per curiam). The court also noted that the use of screening has been
advocated by the American Bar Association and the Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion as well as by numerous scholars. 703 F.2d at 258 (citing ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975); Ill. St. Bar Ass'n,
Professional Ethics Op. 811 (1982); Ill. St. Bar Ass'n, Professional Ethics Op.
762 (1982)).
195. 703 F.2d at 257-59 (citing Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 442-
43 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (former SEC attorney was denied access to relevant
files, discussion of the suit was prohibited in the attorney's presence, and no
members of the firm were permitted to show the attorney any documents relat-
ing to the case), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Kesselhaut v.
United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam) (members of firm
were forbidden to discuss case with former government attorney and were in-
structed to prevent any documents from reaching him; files were kept in a locked
file cabinet and keys were issued to members of firm only when a need to see the
files was demonstrated)). See also Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food
Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 1978) (the former government attorney
was "not allow[ed] to work on any... related matter; he [could] not discuss the
case with anyone employed by [the firm]; he [could] not answer any inquiries
from any litigants in the . . . cases; and all documents and correspondence
[we]re screened to avoid inadvertent violation of these screening procedures").
196. 703 F.2d at 257-59 (citing Greitzer & Locks v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
No. 81-1379, slip op. at 7 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1982) (former government attorney
derived no share in fees from representation); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555
F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam) (attorney was paid a straight salary and
did not receive a share of the firm's earnings)).
197. 703 F.2d at 257-59 (citing Grietzer & Locks v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
No. 81-1379, slip op. (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1982) (screening approved where firm
began to segregate former government attorney when attorney joined firm)).
198. LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 253 (attorney was formerly Assistant State's Attor-
ney in Lake County) (citing Greitzer & Locks v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 81-
1379, slip op. at 7 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1982) (former Justice Department attorney's
new firm permitted to undertake representation which attorney would be dis-
qualified from undertaking where attorney was screened from rest of firm); Arm-
strong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (due to effective
screening, former SEC attorney's firm permitted to undertake representation
50
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ing in former government attorney situations, but they do not provide
for screening in situations where an attorney switches from one private
firm to another.' 99
Schiessle, decided about six months after LaSalle, was the first case
decided to support expressly the extension of screening to situations
involving attorneys who switch from one private firm to another. 20 0
Although the Schiessle court did disqualify the tainted attorney's firm, the
court examined the record for evidence proving that the attorney had
been screened. 20 1 Because the Schiessle court examined the record for
proof of screening, it is suggested that the court implicitly acknowledged
that a firm could rebut the presumption of shared confidences by prop-
erly screening an attorney who possesses relevant client confidences ob-
tained from his former firm. In addition, it should be noted that the
Schiessle court quoted dicta from Analytica, which supports the conclusion
that adequate screening is sufficient to rebut the presumption of shared
confidences where the attorney who subjects the firm to potential vicari-
which involved matters which were both adverse and substantially related to
matters over which the former SEC attorney had substantial responsibility while
employed by the SEC), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Kesselhaut
v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam) (same; former govern-
ment employee)). See also King & Pitts, supra note 98, at 23 ("Screening the
attorney for the former client from the existing matter, which will then be han-
dled by another lawyer in the firm, is a mechanism that is often proposed to
avoid conflict of interest. Almost invariably the courts rejected it. The sole ex-
ception involves government attorneys."). For discussions of how screening
protects the firm of a former government attorney from vicarious disqualifica-
tion, see generally Liebman, supra note *; Comment, supra note 11; Comment,
Adverse Interests, supra note 8; Note, Ethical Problems, supra note *; Comment Future
of the Chinese Wall Defense, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 151 (1981); Ill. St. Bar Ass'n,
Professional Ethics Op. 762 (1982); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975). See also Central Milk Producers Coop. v.
Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 993 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to disqualify the firm of a former government
attorney who possessed privileged confidential information about the moving
party where 1) the screening initially had been approved by the movant; 2) there
was no allegation of actual impropriety; and 3) the district court "found that
disqualification would not be in the best interest of justice").
199. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983)
("Imputed Disqualification: General Rule") with id. Rule 1.11 ("Successive Gov-
ernment and Private Employment"). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT DR 5-11 legal background (Alternative Draft/Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility Format, May 30, 1981). The drafters noted that DR 5-11 "does not
provide for screening as a mechanism to avert disqualification absent a waiver by
the affected client. . . . Absent their consent, clients need not rely on assur-
ances that screening will adequately safeguard confidential information." Id.
200. See Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421. The court opined that "the presumption
of shared confidences could be rebutted by demonstrating that 'specific institu-
tional mechanisms' . . . had been implemented to effectively insulate against
any flow of confidential information from the 'infected' attorney to any other
member of his present firm." Id. (citing LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 259).
201. Id.
NOTE
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ous disqualification comes from another private firm.202
Another case which indirectly supports the extension of screening
to insulate the firm of an attorney who switches from one private firm to
another while in possession of confidences of the clients of his former
firm is Armstrong v. McAlpin. 20 3 The case arose when a former SEC attor-
202. Id. at 420 n.2. Footnote two contained the court's approach to the
role of screening when an attorney changes firms:
There is an exception for the case where a member or associate of
a law firm (or government legal department) changes jobs, and later he
or his new firm is retained by an adversary of a client of his former firm.
In such a case, even if there is a substantial relationship between the
two matters, the lawyer can avoid disqualification by showing that effec-
tive measures were taken to prevent confidences from being received
by whichever lawyers in the new firm are handling the new matter.
Id. (quoting Analytica, 708 F.2d at 1267 (citations omitted)).
While the approval of screening found in Analytica and Schiessle is desireable,
it is suggested that Analytica is unsupported by any of the cases upon which it
relied to develop the proposition. See generally Novo, 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir.
1979) (en banc); Freeman, 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982); LaSalle, 703 F.2d 252
(7th Cir. 1983). In Novo, the challenged attorneys never directly represented the
moving party, but the representation had been undertaken by a former partner
in the firm who had not shared any of the party's confidences. Novo, 607 F.2d at
197 (en banc). In Freeman, the court never reached the question of whether the
challenged attorney's entire firm must be disqualified, because the court re-
manded the action to the district court for a determination of whether the chal-
lenged attorney personally possessed any confidences of the moving party.
Freeman, 689 F.2d at 722-23. Finally, the LaSalle court dealt with a motion to
disqualify the firm of a former government attorney, a situation which most
courts distinguish from other situations. For further discussion of Novo, Freeman,
Analytica, LaSalle, and Schiessle, see supra notes 61-99, 144-48, 151-62, 176-77 &
183-91 and accompanying text.
203. 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
The appeal in Armstrong was instituted after the district court denied McAlpin's
motion to disqualify Armstrong's counsel. Id. at 435. The district judge found
that the challenged representation "did not threaten the integrity of the trial,
and that [the moving party] had suffered no prejudice as a result of the represen-
tation." Id. at 437 (citing Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.
1978)). On appeal, a panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's decision. Id. See also Armstrong, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979). The
court of appeals then determined, en banc, that the panel lacked jurisdiction to
hear the appeal. Id. at 440. Despite the lack ofjurisdiction, the court went on to
decide the merits of the appeal in order to provide guidance to district courts
and to avoid waste of judicial resources. Id. at 441-42 (citing In re Multi-Piece
Rim Liability Litig., 612 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (denial of dis-
qualification is not immediately appealable, but reaching the merits of the ap-
peal because all prior cases in the circuit held contrary), vacated and appeal
dismissed sub nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981);
Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 295 (6th Cir. 1970)).
The United States Supreme Court vacated Armstrong without opinion after disap-
proving of the decision in a footnote to Firestone. See Firestone, 449 U.S. at 379-80
n.15; Armstrong, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981) (vacating the decision of the Second
Circuit).
Although the Supreme Court vacated Armstrong, the decision still retains
value in that it informs district courts within the Second Circuit of how the
courts of appeals would rule today if a similar case were to come before the
[Vol. 30: p. 463
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ney, Altman, joined a private firm which was retained as cocounsel for
Armstrong in a suit against McAlpin. 20 4 In the course of his employ-
ment with the SEC, Atlman had participated in the investigation and
prosecution of McAlpin in the very matters which gave rise to the suit by
Armstrong.20 5 Two years after Armstrong commenced the action
against McAlpin, the defendant moved for disqualification of Altman's
firm, asserting that Altman's former government employment and his
participation in the SEC's investigation of McAlpin gave rise to a conflict
of interest. 20 6
In determining whether the representation of Armstrong by Alt-
man's firm was proper, the Second Circuit relied upon Board of Education
v. Nyquist,20 7 a Second Circuit decision announced in the previous
year. 20 8 In Nyquist, the court held that "unless an attorney's conduct
tends to 'taint the underlying trial' . . . courts should be quite hesitant
to disqualify an attorney." 20 9 The Armstrong court found that permitting
court through proper channels. For a discussion of the proper channels for
bringing an appeal from a district court order granting or denying disqualifica-
tion, see supra note 28.
While the Supreme Court vacated Armstrong without opinion, it is suggested
that the Supreme Court's vacating of the decision should be interpreted as a
rejection of the case solely because the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction; the
Court did not consider the merits of Armstrong. Cf Firestone, 449 U.S. at 379-80
n. 15 (rejecting the notion that a federal court of appeals may agree to decide the
merits of a case over which the court lacks jurisdiction). For a thorough discus-
sion of Armstrong, see Note, supra note 198, For a discussion of thejurisdiction of
the federal courts of appeals to hear interlocutory appeals of district court rul-
ings on motions to disqualify counsel on the grounds of a conflict of interest, see
supra notes 22-23.
204. 625 F.2d at 435. Armstrong was appointed as receiver for the Capital
Growth Companies, a conglomeration from which McAlpin and other defend-
ants were accused of embezzling millions of dollars. Id. Armstrong initially re-
tained as his counsel a New York firm in which he was a partner. Id. Two years
later, however, Armstrong's firm learned of a potential conflict of interest which
might result from the possibility that another client of the firm might be joined
as a codefendant with McAlpin. Id. Because McAlpin had fled to Costa Rica,
counsel had to be retained which had familiarity with Costa Rican law. Id. Addi-
tionally, because McAlpin had fled with practically all of the companies' funds,
Armstrong was left with minimal capital for retaining counsel. Id. at 435 & n.2.
Armstrong selected the firm of Gordon, Hurwitz, Butowski, Baker, Weitzen &
Shalov (Altman's firm). Id. at 436.
205. Id. at 435. The SEC obtained a default judgement against McAlpin
after he fled to Costa Rica to avoid prosecution by the SEC. Id. As receiver for
the Capital Growth Companies, Armstrong was responsible for initiating suit
against McAlpin in both the United States and Costa Rica in order to recover the
money which the district court had adjudged McAlpin to be liable. Id.
206. Id. at 436-37.
207. 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979).
208. 625 F.2d at 444-46 (citing Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979)).
209. 590 F.2d at 1246 (citing W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 678
(2d Cir. 1976)). The Nyquist court identified two classes of cases where an attor-
ney's conduct could taint the underlying trial:
(1) where an attorney's conflict of interests. . . undermines the court's
1985] NOTE 515
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Altman's firm to remain as counsel for Armstrong would not taint the
underlying trial because 1) Altman had been effectively screened from
the firm in regard to the representation, 2 10 and 2) all records possessed
by the SEC concerning McAlpin had been turned over to Armstrong.2 1 1
In its preliminary discussion, the Armstrong court accepted the prem-
ise that a strict rule of disqualification of former government attorneys
and their firms "may ultimately affect adversely the quality of the serv-
ices of government attorneys. ' 2 12 The court noted that "screening"
confidence in the vigor of the attorney's representation of his client,
[and] ...(2) where the attorney is at least potentially in a position to
use privileged information concerning the other side through prior
representation ...thus giving his present client an unfair advantage.
Id. (citations omitted).
210. 625 F.2d at 445. The court found that Altman had been "entirely
screened from all participation in the case, to the satisfaction of the district court
and the SEC." Id. (footnote omitted). The screening used in Armstrong included
the following: 1) the former government attorney was excluded from participa-
tion in the challenged action; 2) the attorney was denied access to relevant files;
3) the attorney derived no remuneration from funds obtained by the firm in
connection with the challenged representation; 4) other members of the firm
were prohibited from discussing the representation with the attorney; and 5) the
attorney was prevented from imparting any information concerning the litiga-
tion to other members of the firm. Id. at 442 (citing Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461
F. Supp. 622, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
211. 625 F.2d at 445. The court found that Altman's firm was not in a posi-
tion to obtain any confidential information possessed by Altman that was not
already possessed by Armstrong, because the SEC had turned over to Arm-
strong all records relating to McAlpin. Id. It is suggested that this conclusion,
although factually correct, is contrary to the established precedent in the field of
attorney disqualification. For a discussion of cases holding that the privilege of
confidential information is not destroyed by the subsequent disclosure of the
privileged information to other parties, see supra note 35. But see MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983) (information can be used if it later
becomes public knowledge).
212. 625 F.2d at 443. The court stated that a strict rule of disqualification
could "hamper the government's efforts to hire qualified attorneys ... [for]
fear that government service will transform them into legal 'Typhoid Marys,'
shunned by prospective private employers because hiring them may result in the
disqualification of an entire firm in a possibly wide range of cases." Id. (footnote
omitted). The court's conclusion was supported by amicus briefs prepared by
the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, the Federal Maritime Commission and twenty-six former
government attorneys, including two former Attorneys General and two former
Solicitors General of the United States. Id. The court also noted the contention
of the amici that "those already employed by the government may be unwilling
to assume positions of greater responsibility within the government that might
serve to heighten their undesireability to future private employers." Id.
See also United States v. Standard Oil, 136 F. Supp. 345, 362-63 (S.D.N.Y.
1955). The Standard Oil court said that the former government attorney's duty
of fidelity "must be given a practical scope." The court found such a view to be
necessary because
[i]f service with the government will tend to sterilize an attorney in too
large an area of law for too long a time, or will prevent him from engag-
ing in practice of the very specialty for which the government sought
516
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might be an acceptable solution to such an undesirable result.2 13 The
court continued its analysis, however, and ultimately rested its decision
on the broader grounds that such motions should be decided by a "re-
strained approach," which required that a representation be permitted
unless the moving party could prove that the representation would taint
the integrity of the trial process. 21 4 Because the court found that the
representation of Armstrong by Altman's firm did not taint the trial pro-
cess, the court reversed the panel determination that the firm should be
disqualified.2 1 5 Thus, while the Armstrong court had an opportunity to
rest its decision on the narrow ground that the polices peculiar to gov-
ernment service require screening to be permitted to insulate a former
government attorney's firm from disqualification, the court chose to rest
its holding on broader grounds which would be applicable to situations
where the attorney had switched from one private firm to another.
It is suggested that future courts should follow the lead of Schiessle
his service-and if that sterilization will spread to the firm with which
he becomes associated-the sacrifices of entering government service
will be too great for most men to make.
Id.
The Standard Oil court also explained that strict rules of disqualification will
make it difficult for clients "to obtain counsel, particularly in those specialties
and suits dealing with government." Id. (footnote omitted). For other discus-
sions of the special considerations favoring the application of a lenient standard
for deciding disqualification motions when former government attorneys are the
subject of the motion, see Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores,
Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 1978); Kaufman, supra note *, at 657-58; Laco-
vara, supra note 138, at 374-93 (discusses both federal statutes prohibiting for-
mer government attorneys from undertaking adverse subsequent
representations and the Code of Professional Responsibility); Comment, supra
note 8, at 209-10; Comment, supra note 11, at 692-704. One commentator ar-
gues that the general policies requiring the application of an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of disclosed confidences are overridden by "the strong public policy
favoring job mobility of ex-government attorneys ...... Id. at 701.
213. 625 F.2d at 442-43 ("the proper screening of Altman rather than dis-
qualification of [his] firm is the solution to the present dispute") (quoting Arm-
strong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). The court also
noted that a formal opinion of the American Bar Association supports the use of
screening in situations involving former government attorneys. Id. at 443 (citing
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 342
(1975)).
214. 625 F.2d at 444-46 (citing Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241,
1246 (2d Cir. 1979)). While the Armstrong court spoke at length about the poli-
cies underlying the consideration of a motion to disqualify the firm of a former
government attorney on the ground that the former government attorney would
be disqualified if he undertook the challenged representation, the court ulti-
mately rested its decision on other grounds:
We do not believe that it is necessary or appropriate for this court to
enter fully into the fray. . . . Indeed, the current uncertainty over what
is "ethical" underscores for us the wisdom, when considering such is-
sues, of adopting a restrained approach that focuses primarily on pre-
serving the integrity of the trial process.
Id. at 444 (citation and footnote omitted).
215. Id. at 445-46.
55
Silverstein: Attorney Disqualification for a Conflict of Interest in Federal C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
and Armstrong when considering whether a firm should be disqualified
vicariously as a result of an attorney who joined the firm while in the
possession of relevant confidences of clients from his former firm.
2 16
III. CONCLUSION
The law of attorney disqualification for a conflict of interest is very
complicated, but an organization can be found within the body of law
which makes it possible to predict with some measure of accuracy how
the courts will decide a given motion. While such a prediction is possi-
ble, it must take into account the potential for misconstruction by the
courts of both the correct rules of decision and of the complicated fac-
tual distinctions underlying the motion.
It is suggested that the courts will adhere closely to the following
standards:
1. An irrebuttable presumption of disclosed confidences ap-
plies where an attorney undertakes to represent a client in
an action where a former client of that attorney is an ad-
verse party, and where there is a substantial relationship
between the prior representation of the former client and
the current representation. 21 7
2. An irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences applies
where the challenged attorney has never represented the
moving party, but is a member of the firm in which another
attorney previously represented the moving party, and the
attorney who undertook the previous representation is still
an attorney with the firm. 21 8
3. In any other situation the presumption of shared confi-
216. Cf Comment, supra note 8, at 212 ("effective isolation of the disquali-
fied attorney should prove a sufficient safeguard" against disclosure of protected
confidences); Comment, supra note 11, at 682 (while the rejection of screening
may have been necessary in "days when law firms were smaller and practice less
specialized," continued rejection of such procedures is unwarranted); id. at 680
(comparison of screening within law firms and within financial institutions indi-
cates that screening is "sufficiently effective to rebut the presumption that all
members of a law firm share in a client's confidences"); Unchanging Rules, supra
note *, at 1067 (rejection of screening in private attorney situation creates a
"substantial hardship" upon young associates who cannot be integrated within a
firm).
217. It is submitted that the irrebuttable presumption of disclosed confi-
dences developed by T.C. Theatre and its progeny reveal that an individual attor-
ney can not defend against a disqualification motion other than to attempt to
prove that no "substantial relationship" exists between the attorney's previous
representation of the moving party and the challenged representation. For a
discussion of the presumption of disclosed confidences, see supra notes 54-130
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the confusion existing among the
courts as to what facts establish a substantial relationship, see supra note 52.
218. For a discussion of the situation where the presumption of shared con-
fidences is irrebuttable, see supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30: p. 463
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dences is rebuttable. 2 19
In situations where the disqualified attorney has switched from one
firm to another, there is some uncertainty as to whether the court will
permit the other members of the attorney's firm to rebut the presump-
tion of shared confidences by proof of screening. 220 The current trend,
however, appears to be in favor of screening. 22 1
Bruce L. Silverstein
219. For a discussion of the situations where the presumption of shared
confidences is rebuttable, see supra notes 151-216 and accompanying text.
220. For a discussion of the uncertainty that exists over permitting a firm to
use screening to escape disqualification where the attorney screened is not a
former government attorney, see supra notes 192-216 and accompanying text.
221. For a discussion of the decisions indicating that the courts should ac-
cept proof of screening as rebuttal to the presumption of shared confidences,
see supra notes 200-216 and accompanying text.
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